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Introduction
American news anchor Ted Koppel perhaps best summed up the appeal of Lyndon
Johnson, the 36th President of the United States, when he said, “We like, as Americans,
that sort of western image of the big, swaggering, broad-shouldered American coming
into the town that is in trouble and clearing everything up." Johnson is perhaps the first
American political figure to fully embody cowboy, western, and frontier mythology.
Johnson represents an important shift in politics towards a strategy involving the
conscious manipulation of imagery to achieve both local, statewide, and national
electoral appeal. Most historians argue that Johnson’s conscious and overt manipulation
of cowboy and western mythology began after his election to the Senate in November of
1948. In actuality, Johnson began to manipulate frontier myth as early as in his election
to the House of Representatives in 1937.
Johnson, as candidate for Congress, Congressman, and candidate for Senate
consciously participated in the development of a politically advantageous western and
cowboy identity. The elements of Johnson’s voting record and persona he chose to
emphasize in campaigns reflected both his internal struggle to define a political identity,
and his efforts to move with the rapid shifts in political ideology occurring in Texas and
the nation as a whole. Through the use of image, Johnson cultivated a political
philosophy—a philosophy that combined elements of populism, the New Deal, and myth
—in which he truly believed.

6

Essential to a full analysis of those forces that shaped Johnson’s personal life and
molded his political identity are several critical political biographies of Johnson. Johnson
was an incredibly complex man. Perhaps this explains why there are so many different
interpretations of his life. Many biographers of Johnson in a post-Vietnam era were
exceedingly harsh. The Vietnam War served as catalyst for negative portrayals of
Johnson. These portrayals are the consequence of what the war did to the nation, and
because of this war, a generation of Americans can only see Johnson through the lens of
Vietnam. However, more recently Johnson has enjoyed something of a rehabilitation in
the minds of Americans and biographers alike because of a greater focus on the positive
aspects of his presidency, most notably his Great Society programs.
Much of my analysis stems from these biographies: Robert Caro’s The Years of
Lyndon Johnson series, Path to Power 1 and Means of Ascent2 , Robert Dallek’s Lone Star
Rising,3 Ronnie Dugger’s The Politician: The Drive for Power, from the Frontier to
Master of the Senate,4 and Paul Conkin’s Big Daddy From the Pedernales.5 Caro’s
biographies present an image of Johnson as a conniving, manipulative man desperate for
power. Dallek’s biography of Johnson is also decidedly negative. Dugger and Conkin
present kinder interpretations of Johnson’s drive, while still demonstrating that Johnson
was conscious of his manipulation of western mythology to achieve political goals. My

1

Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, (New York: Knopf: 1982).

2

Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent, (New York: Knopf: 1990).

3

Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising, (New York: Oxford University Press: 1991).

4

Ronnie Dugger, The Politician: The Drive for Power, from the Frontier to Master of the Senate, (New
York: WW Norton & Company: 1982).
5

Paul C. Conkin, Big Daddy From the Pedernales, (Boston: Twayne Publishers: 1986).
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work differs from the existing biographical literature of Johnson because it places much
greater emphasis on Johnson’s early recognition of the significance of frontier mythology
to his identity.
Three works, Jane Tompkins’ West of Everything,6 Richard Slotkin’s Gunfighter
Nation,7 and Henry Nash Smith’s Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth8
established the context of the cowboy, western, and frontier mythology that shaped
Johnson’s political strategies. West of Everything deals specifically with the
dissemination of the myth through literature and film. My work uses Gunfighter Nation
as a jumping off point into the world of myth. I use Slotkin’s definition of myth to
explain precisely what we mean when we speak of myths, which here are stories and
symbols “drawn from a society’s history that have acquired through persistent usage the
power of symbolizing that society’s ideology and of dramatizing its moral consciousness
with all the complexities and contradictions that consciousness may contain.”9
Additionally, Slotkin’s work provides my basis for an understanding of the violent,
individualistic, masculinized strain of the frontier myth. Virgin Land provides the basis
for what I argue is Lyndon Johnson’s initial interpretation of the frontier myth: a
feminized strain of the myth that is community-oriented and has a civilization-building
and agrarian focus.

6

Jane Tompkins, West of Everything: The Inner Life of Westerns, (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press:
1993).
7

Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America, (Norman,
OK: University of Oklahoma Press: 1998).
8

Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press: 1978).
9

Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 5.
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Also vitally important in establishing the proper context and environment in
which Lyndon Johnson’s political development took place were George Norris Green’s
The Establishment in Texas Politics,10 and Jordan A. Schwarz’s The New Dealers.11
Green’s work takes the reader through a history of Texas politics and chronicles the
divides that emerged in Texas just as Johnson emerged as a political force. Green’s work
is essential to my understanding of the political conditions and deep divide in the
Democratic Party of Texas that allowed for the success of hillbilly Pappy O’Daniel and
over conservatives. Schwarz’s work provides context for the New Deal, its explosion in
Texas, and Johnson’s work with it. It helps illuminate important behind-the-scenes
political maneuverings in Texas that led to Texas’ place not quite in full support of the
New Deal, but not quite against it either.
Johnson was a master of image and cultivated it most frequently through
speeches, sometimes delivered in person, and in later years after he mastered technology,
via the radio. This work makes frequent use of text from Johnson’s speeches. Contained
clearly in the speeches are the ideas Johnson valued and wished to express.
Fundamentally, these excerpts from Johnson’s speeches represent the type of image he
strove to cultivate.
This work begins with a narrative account of Johnson’s ancestors and life until
1937. It starts with the birth of a boy into a very specific place, the Hill Country. The
land on which Johnson was raised played a large role in the politician he became, so
10

George Norris Green, The Establishment in Texas Politics: The Primitive Years, 1938-57, (Norman, OK:
The University of Oklahoma Press: 1984).
11

Jordan A. Schwarz, The New Dealers: Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt, (New York: Vintage:
1994).
9

careful analysis of that land and the dream-destroying affect it has on people that live on
it are also present. The difficulty of life on the land of the Hill Country, and how that
difficulty led to Populism, an important political movement in Texas and a movement of
vital importance in shaping Johnson’s political ideas because of its emphasis on the
feminized frontier myth’s value of community, is discussed.
Following this context-setting, I move chronologically through time into an
analysis of Johnson as politician from 1937 until 1941. I pay great attention to Johnson’s
win in the 1937 Congressional Election and analyze the reasons why it was politically
advantageous for Johnson to cultivate a political identity based solely on support of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal Platform. Johnson relied heavily on Roosevelt’s
platform because of the program’s enormous popularity with farmers in Texas. This was
important to Johnson because of his personal background with farming and Populism,
which placed heavy value on the farmer.
Next, I take a brief journey into the world of myth. I establish what it means
when we say “frontier,” “cowboy,” and “western.” I examine two popular strains of
frontier mythology, the violent, masculinized strain, and the community-oriented,
agrarian, feminized strain that Johnson embodied in his early political career. I explain
common signifiers of the west, including a particular posture and wardrobe, and examine
how these signifiers and myths have been disseminated through a culture as to be
powerful enough to have political significance. Here, special attention is paid to the
origin of the cowboy dime novel and the popularity of John Wayne Westerns.

10

Following an explanation of myth, I examine Johnson’s failed senatorial bid of
1941. Working within my established context of myth, I explain that Johnson lost the
election because he failed to capitalize upon a populist appeal. I explain the important
political lesson Johnson learned from his opponent Pappy O’Daniel’s successful
employment of myth and signifiers of the west—that populism and becoming one of the
people is more important than telling the people what you will do for them.
Then, I move to the years 1941-1948 and examine how, even while at war,
Johnson cultivated a political image that was in line with his interpretation of the frontier
myth. Johnson evoked strains of both the masculinized and feminized versions of the
frontier myth in his wartime positions. I use speeches to chronicle Johnson’s frequent use
of frontier mythology in his successful bid for reelection.
Finally, I examine Johnson’s successful and complete employment of a frontier
image in one of the most significant elections in Texas history—Johnson’s bid for Senate
against Coke Stevenson. Here, through his speeches and radio addresses, I present an
image of Lyndon Johnson finally completely comfortable and self-assured in his role as
western politician. I demonstrate his use of myth to great advantage. Then, I move to a
brief analysis of Johnson’s shift from using feminized version of the myth while
campaigning to using the masculinized version of the myth while in higher office. I
argue that this shift is responsible for the ultimate downfall of Johnson’s political career
—the Vietnam War.
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Chapter One:
Pride, Poverty, and Populism:
Molding Forces of Lyndon Johnson’s Early Life
To truly understand the transformation of Johnson’s image that allowed him to
become the political force that was the Lyndon Johnson of the House of Representatives
and Senate, one must first understand the land where he was raised, his ancestors, his
upbringing, and his early life. Since the end of his presidency, many biographers have
chronicled Johnson’s rise to to power. There is, however, some disagreement on
Johnson’s true motivations at almost every important juncture in his life.12 Though
interpretations of these motivations may differ, and though we will never know straight
from the horse’s mouth Johnson’s true motivations, there is value in a close examination
of the forces that played a significant role in shaping Lyndon Johnson. Fundamentally,
Johnson was shaped by the forces of a landscape that led people who lived there to a
special breed of Texas populism.
Fundamentally, Johnson’s early political journey and shift in image mirrors the
story of the evolution of Texas and American politics at large. Lyndon Johnson’s rise to
power coincided with an America ready to accept populism on a large scale. Johnson
successfully brought the power of the frontier myth of cooperation to a larger audience.

12

Perhaps the most respected biographer of Johnson is historian Robert A. Caro, who presents a decidedly
negative imagining of Johnson in his series The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York:
Knopf, 1982). I rely extensively on Caro in this chapter, but would be remiss if I did not also mention
historian Robert Dallek’s important biographical work Lone Star Rising (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991). Dallek’s work strikes balance, presenting Johnson as a more complicated and morally
ambiguous figure than the Johnson of Caro’s work. Also important to this chapter is the work of founding
editor of the Texas Observer, Ronnie Dugger, The Politician: The Drive for Power, from the Frontier to
Master of the Senate (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1982). These biographies are important in that
they present themes that shaped Johnson’s early life; these themes are the foundation upon which an
analysis of Johnson’s later use of cowboy and western mythology rest. Also of note: all three of these
biographies (even Caro’s) are sold in the gift shop of the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas.
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Texas populism is precisely what Johnson’s upbringing primed him to bring to a national
stage.
As important as an understanding of Johnson’s ancestors themselves is
understanding the land that shaped them. Most fundamentally, the Hill Country of Texas
is “a trap—a trap baited with grass.”13 Before Lyndon’s ancestors arrived, the Hill
Country lacked civilization. As the white man brought civilization to this land—at once
stunningly beautiful and impossibly difficult; hard on dreams, but long on mythology—
the land tamed the man, and Lyndon’s ancestors, the idealistic Buntons and Johnsons
were particularly affected by this land. Lyndon Johnson came of age on the land of the
Texas Hill Country. This land was difficult, and this land helped shape the way that
people including Lyndon Johnson viewed politics. Johnson’s brand of populism and his
own beliefs about the frontier myth were borne of this land and what living on and
farming this land for a living does to individuals.
The mythology of the Hill Country and its special place in Texas history are
important to an understanding of later themes Johnson used in his campaigns for the
House of Representatives and the Senate. Johnson used these themes to evoke a feeling
in the voting population of his district that they were in a place of mythic significance to
America, Texas, and the frontier. Texas occupies a unique position in American
geography—at once, it is both southern and western. The Hill Country is perhaps the
first place in Texas to be considered a truly western space. Thus, the Hill Country served
as sort of birthplace for all western and frontier myth in Texas. This place of hardship,

13

Caro, Path to Power, 8.
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where cooperation and governmental assistance were crucial for success, was the
birthplace of frontier myth in Texas and in the mind of Lyndon Johnson.
Figure 1: Geographical Regions of Texas

The geographical regions of Texas, labeled by number. The Texas Hill Country is
represented by number three and encompasses the central portion of Texas and most
notably, the city of Austin.14
The white men who first settled the Hill Country in the 1840s and 1850s were
farmers who viewed it as a land of abundance.15 The settlers were largely southern
mountaineers—rural immigrants desperate to make a living.16 The tall grass that grew in

14

ICUT, “Regional Map of Texas,” Independent Colleges and Universities of Texas, http://www.icut.org/
RegionalMap.html, accessed March 4, 2012.
15

Terry G. Jordan, "Hill Country," Handbook of Texas Online, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/
articles/ryh02, accessed March 04, 2012. Published by the Texas State Historical Association.
16

Jordan, “Hill Country.”
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the Hill Country was a sign to these men that their crops would certainly grow, food for
their cattle would be abundant, and wealth would come to them.17 What these men did
not know was that this tall grass had grown over centuries, and its growth had only been
made possible through prairie fires. The soil beneath the slow-growing grass was thin
soil; the Hill Country was limestone country, a difficult place to grow crops because it
produced fertile soil very slowly. This problem was compounded by the fact that the
Texas Hill Country is, as its name implies, rather hilly. The thin layers of fertile soil that
developed were particularly vulnerable to wind and rain.18 This made farming incredibly
difficult and governmental assistance vital to the survival of those who made their
livelihood farming.
In the Hill Country, there is a line of grave importance which early settlers did not
understand. Perhaps if they had they would have abandoned this land. The line, called
“isohyet,” is a line “drawn on a map so that all points along it have equal rainfall.”19 This
line, coupled with the Hill Country’s unusually high rate of evaporation and uneven
distribution of rainfall, meant disaster for farmers trying to produce crops: “east of that
line...farmers could prosper; west of it, they couldn’t.”20 It is crucial to emphasize that
early settlers did not know they were crossing this line. Moving westward, moving to
this Hill Country, was a way to escape poverty and pursue fortunes beyond one’s wildest
dreams. These men did not and could not have possibly comprehended the ways in

17

Caro, Path to Power, 11.

18

Dugger, The Drive for Power, 26.

19

Caro, Path to Power, 12.

20

Ibid.
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which this land would break both them and their dreams. From an early age, because of
the difficulty of the land his family farmed, Lyndon Johnson was cognizant of the
important role government played in the daily lives of individuals.
It is important to examine Lyndon Johnson’s ancestors particularly because Hill
Country ranchers were “convinced of the importance of breeding.”21 Though breeding
typically refers to animals, here we speak instead of certain traits that can be born in a
person, traits that are passed down from generation to generation and are inescapable.
Johnson later came to understand that his ancestors and their ties to the Hill Country, a
land of mythic significance, could be of special use to him in his pursuance of a political
career. His ancestors were the people who made Texas. Three years before his mother
died, she told Lyndon the stories of his ancestors, and with these tales, gave him “the
authenticated venerability of their ancestors.”22
The first Bunton to set foot in Texas had such a strong personality that those who
met him never forgot him.23 John Wheeler Bunton, a hero of Texas Independence, signed
the Texas Declaration of Independence. Bunton left his family with two traits that came
to characterize them: ambition and toughness. In fact, ambition is the hallmark of what
Caro refers to as the “Bunton strain.” This strain was carried on by the next Bunton to go
West: Lyndon’s great-grandfather, Robert Holmes Bunton. The Buntons were unusual
among frontier Texans in that they were “interested in ideas and abstractions.”24

21

Caro, Path to Power, 40.

22

Dugger, The Politician, 27.

23

Caro, Path to Power, 4.

24

Caro, Path to Power, 6.
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Interested in ideas though they may have been, the Buntons also possessed a “hard,
tough, practical side,” and the ability to be realistic about their big ideas.25 Perhaps this is
the most important element of the Bunton strain. Practicality made the Buntons adept at
handling the difficult terrain of the Hill Country.
The Johnsons, like the Buntons, also had grandiose dreams. They thought they
would “build an empire up in the hills.”26 The Johnsons wanted to be cattle ranchers, but
they were too often frustrated with the difficult terrain of the Hill Country. Sam Ealy
Johnson Sr., Lyndon’s grandfather, was a Johnson to his very core. Johnsons tended
towards romanticism and extravagance, and had a larger than life temper. Like the
Buntons, they were big dreamers. Sam Johnson Sr. married a Bunton, Eliza, a practical
woman who believed “charity [began] at home.”27 While the Buntons had the ability to
tailor their dreams to reality, the Johnsons were “not prudent and practical.”28
The Johnsons were representative of a phenomenon that occurred in post-Civil
War Texas. Texas enjoys a role as crucial part of what Americans imagine as the
stereotypical Old West. Americans tend to view Texas as a land where the rancher and
heroic cowboy live. This image is based upon the men that came to Texas pursuing big
dreams. The majority of men who came to Texas with the Johnsons in this post-war
period from 1865-1890 were cattle ranchers.29 These men closed the Indian frontier all
25

Ibid.

26

Caro, Path to Power, 25.

27

Often, Eliza Bunton invited struggling members of the community to her home to offer food and a kind
work. Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 29.
28

Caro, Path to Power, 28.

29

Randolph C. Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State, (Cary, NC: Oxford University
Press: 2004), 290.
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the while expanding the cattle frontier and contributed to the myth of Texas as a place
that is western.
Texans, including these cattle ranchers, took decisive action to rid the Texas
frontier of buffalo and Indians so that this frontier could be a place for their cattle. From
1874-1880, these Texans engaged in battle with thousands of Comanches, Kiowas, and
Southern Cheyennes. By 1881, the vast majority of Indians were gone from Texas and
the Hill Country.30 Through conquering these Indian foes and largely ridding the Texas
frontier of buffalo, these men opened the way for Texans to raise cattle. This is what
brought the Johnsons to Texas and to the Buntons.
Thus came the complicated mixture of the Bunton and Johnson strains. The three
sons of Sam Johnson and Eliza Bunton had fierce passion, high ambition, and potential
for leadership, but they also possessed the “fatal taint” of the Johnson blood line:
Johnsons, they said, had all of the Buntons’ temper, pride, arrogance,
and idealism, together with dreams even more ambitious, but they had
none of the Bunton hardness, the canniness and pragmatism, that alone
could keep idealism and ambition from bringing ruin in a country as
hard as the Hill Country.31
This mixing of Bunton and Johnson strains is one of the most essential pieces in a
complete understanding of the driving forces of Johnson’s life. Lyndon Johnson was
driven by massive ideas and goals, and possessed a Texas-sized ego to match.
Fundamentally, he was the man he was because of the emphasis his family placed on
these traits.

30

Campbell, Gone to Texas, 296.

31

Caro, Path to Power, 40.
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To go into the rolling hills and dry soil of the Hill Country took courage and big
dreams, something that Lyndon’s Johnson ancestors had in abundance. It cannot be
stressed strongly enough, however, that the Hill Country was not a landscape conducive
to the fulfillment of dreams. The reality of the Hill Country was rock. For most people,
and most particularly for farmers, rock is not conducive to dreams. Rock is the opposite
of conducive to dreams; rock is despair; rock is poverty; rock prevents crops from
growing. Those hoping to grow rich from this land had one of two choices: “plow it or
graze cattle on it.” If either of these things was done to the Hill Country, however, it
would “blow or wash away.”32
“Principles, noble purposes, [and] high aims” were qualities not practical in the
land of the Hill Country. Unfortunately, these qualities were the most defining qualities
of Lyndon’s ancestors. Of a person, the land required an abandoning of all dreams and a
strong, pragmatic approach to dealing practically with problems. From this perspective,
it seems clear the Johnsons were particularly unsuited to such a land.
Sam Johnson Sr. lost his money betting on the future successes of the Hill
Country. This loss drove him to join the Populist movement. Through the South and
West, a sentiment grew among men, particularly farmers, who felt trapped by forces
beyond their control: forces of nature and forces “too big for them to fight.”33 This was a
time of desperation in Sam Johnson’s own life and in the lives of farmers in the Hill
Country. Generally, farmers believed it to be the duty of the government to deal with

32

Caro, Path to Power, 25.

33

Caro, Path to Power, 33.
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their issues because the government, through their “vast subsidies of land and biased
laws” were the reason for the farmers’ major problem: railroads.34
During the late 19th century, railroads served as western landlords. Railroad
companies owned massive tracts of land in the West, which they sold to farmers for a
profit. Farmers of the West were encouraged by these railroad companies to try their
hand at growing cash crops in order to quickly repay the loans they took out to purchase
their land. Cash crops often proved profitable in the short-run.35 However in the long
run, many farmers became dependent on single crops and their markets, and thus were
overly sensitive to market fluctuations.36 Combined with the already difficult land of the
Hill Country, this was economically disastrous to Hill Country farmers. An article in the
April 28, 1887 edition of the Progressive Farmer magazine summed up the attitude and
concerns that drove farmers to join the Populist movement:
There is something radically wrong in our industrial system. There is
a screw loose. The wheels have dropped out of balance. The railroads
have never been so prosperous, and yet agriculture languishes. The banks
have never done a better or more profitable business, and yet agriculture
languishes. Manufacturing enterprises never made more money or were
in a more flourishing condition, and yet agriculture languishes. Towns
and cities flourish and ‘boom’ and grow and ‘boom,’ and yet agriculture
languishes. Salaries and fees were never so temptingly high and desirable,
and yet agriculture languishes.37

34

Caro, Path to Power, 36.

35

The most common cash crop in Texas? Cotton.

36

Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Movement: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America. (New
York: Oxford University Press: 1978), 36.
37

Kenneth G. McCarty, “Farmers and the Populist Party, 1870-1900,” Mississippi Historical Society.
(http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/articles/163), accessed Match 5, 2012.
20

Here, we see enumerated the essence of the Populist movement. Populism, and
particularly the Texas Populism Sam Johnson participated in, was about the frustration of
a group of people who felt that they were not getting a fair deal from the government. It
was a movement concerned with the growth of big business and the decline of
agriculture. The movement valued governmental assistance for farmers because it placed
great importance on the role of agriculture in America.
The Populist Party was the party of the people of the Hill Country. The reality of
the Hill Country was trying to scratch out a living with very few raw natural resources.
This brutal reality made people of the Hill Country particularly susceptible to movements
like Populism. These were people who wanted their government to intervene and fight
for them. The Populist movement took the shape of a group of farmers oppressed by
their land, wanting and needed governmental assistance in major ways. From
government, these people sought an advocate and a force that would protect them from
the strengthening influence of big businesses. The Hill Country was, quite literally, a
frontier. This Populist movement was the stuff of which popular Western entertainment
was made. These ideas were important to Sam Johnson Sr., and would remain important
in the lives of his children and crucially, in the life of his grandson, Lyndon. Populism
was in Lyndon’s DNA.
The agrarian reform movement known as Populism found political expression in
Texas as the People's party, which evolved from the Grange, the Greenback party, and the
Farmers' Alliance into the most successful of the third-party movements in state history,
though by 1900, it was largely incorporated into the Democratic party. The program had

21

as its major demands the preservation of land from large and alien landowners, regulation
of transportation, and increase of the amount of money in circulation.38 How money was
created and circulated defined the relationship between farmers, urban workers, and big
business. This relationship defined who controlled the rules and the money, and
determined which Americans made an income necessary to maintain “a living of some
dignity.”39 The history of the People's party in Texas demands particular interest because
the party benefited from a grass-roots communication structure. Movement toward
establishing a third party in Texas began in the late 1880s and culminated with the formal
organization of a Texas People's party in 1891. It was under this party that Sam Johnson
Jr. ran for a seat in the House of Representatives. Though Johnson lost, his political
affiliations are of great importance in tracing Lyndon Johnson’s political development.
Populism expressed an important vision for America’s future. Johnson took elements of
Populism with him, particularly elements that emphasized the value of the common man,
and used them to great advantage in the development of his cowboy image.
In addition to an examination of Populism, it is crucial to our understanding of
Lyndon Johnson to pay special attention to the political moods of the place that shaped
him. Texas, and the Hill Country in particular, are places with deep political complexity
and competing interests at work. The world in which Lyndon Johnson came to political
maturity was a changing one, but in Texas, the place from which Lyndon got his sense of
political being, 19th century values that included racism, reigned supreme.

38 Also

important concerns to members of the Populist movement were tax reform, trust regulation,
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Texas is unique among states in that its history is treated with near equal
importance to American history. It has a reputation for producing national leaders, and it
has a political climate all its own. Though depictions of the frontier as an individualistic
place are nothing more than the stuff of myth, perhaps because of their long history of
struggle with the land and foreign occupiers of that land, Texans value individualism and
self-sufficiency, and think of this as a characteristic of their frontier heritage. Even today,
candidates who come from Texas often wear cowboy hats and call themselves ranchers.
All of this is a reflection of Texas as a place that is western. Fundamentally, however,
Texas, at least since the beginning of the 20th century, has been caught between its
southern and western political heritages. Texas is a hugely complex place. Any single
list of qualities that we might label "Texan" will be partial, overly static, not applicable to
everyone in the state, and maybe even internally contradictory. Lyndon Johnson was
born into this struggle, and this struggle shaped his politics.
Between Reconstruction, the period after the American Civil War, and World War
II, powerful interest groups dominated Texas politics.40 Forces like railroads, ranching,
and later oil, gas, and sulfur exerted significant influence on state government. These
powerful, money-hungry industries rarely experienced any opposition in their quest for
total domination of the political interests of the state, as most Texans had a certain
fondness, or at least acceptance of the practice of big business and conservatism. In this
way, Texas was very much a southern place. Johnson, however, descended from
ancestors with an agricultural background.
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The Populist movement, with which Lyndon’s grandfather was associated,
occurred when the plight of the majority became so unbearable, a rebellion against the
conservative forces that controlled Texas was in order. The state, nearly without
exception, fell back to conservatism because big business’ grip on the state was too tight
for the little people— the farmers, the ranchers, and the working man—to overcome. 41
The Texas in which Lyndon Johnson came to political maturity was a Texas that
maintained the values of the Old South patron system. The primary purpose of
government in Texas was preservation of the social order. The various strands of Texas
political culture can be boiled down to three main ideological tendencies: economic
liberalism (faith in a free market economy) combined with social conservatism (favoring
traditional values and moralism), overlaid with populism (promoting the rights and
worthiness of ordinary people). 42 This is crucial—that the populism in which Lyndon
Johnson and his family believed was about promoting and helping ordinary people.
These tendencies intermingled and overlapped to create a turbulent political culture
unique to Texas.
The history of the Texas party system reflects the political heritage of the rest of
the old South, including secession from the Union and racial segregation. But the party
system in Texas is also shaped by other equally important currents that it shares with
western states, like its focus on concerns with issues like ranching, farming, and the
problem of water. Even today, historians don’t seem know just where Texas fits.
41
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Certainly Texas feels southern. Texas history in inextricably linked the the history of the
South. Texas seceded with the South and maintained a southern perspective on race
issues. Populism is essential to understanding the history of Texas as a state that has a
western political culture. Populism, fundamentally, is about the little man (in this case
the farmer), standing up to government forces who seek to bleed him dry. Populism is
about taking a stand and fighting back.
Perhaps in actuality, Texas is more southern than western. But here, the real
question of importance is what Texans choose to identify with: a southern heritage or a
western heritage. Johnson’s ancestors and Johnson himself chose to identify with both
Texas’ mythic and concrete western heritages. Johnson, in his campaigns for elected
office, saw political advantage in such identification. When he discovered campaigns
would be won or lost based on Populist appeals and the cultivation of a western image, he
chose to de-emphasize the southern and play up the western. Johnson’s identity was
shaped by a place that is, in actuality, neither completely southern nor western. In
Johnson’s speeches and radio addresses to the people of Texas while running for
Congress and the Senate, we don’t see him engage in the southern issues of the day. He
ignored issues of race entirely. Instead, we see him engage with the problems faced by
farmers and the symbolism of the West. He spoke of bringing electrification to towns,
controlling rivers and dams, and securing relief and aid for ranchers and farmers. He
didn’t act or dress like he was a part of the old boys network in the South. Instead, he
wore cowboy boots and took special care to be photographed around cattle and on a
horse. For Johnson, the answer was clear: Texas was a western space.
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Sam Ealy Johnson Jr., son of Sam Ealy Johnson Sr., and father of Lyndon Baines
Johnson, stayed in the Hill Country like his father before him. Sam Jr. had ambitions to
be something greater than a farmer. He wanted to be a lawyer, but the realities of his life
meant he needed to make money, so a cotton farmer he became.43 Despite the difficulty
of the land, Sam Jr. had several successful years as a farmer. Because of his success,
image was of particular concern to Sam, who residents of the Hill Country recall
frequently said, “you can tell a man by his boots and his hat and the horse he rides.”44
After several years as a farmer, Sam was nominated to represent the 89th District
in the Texas House of Representatives. Though nominated as a Democrat, “the Populist
Party may have been dead, Populist principles weren’t.”45 Sam saw the concerns of the
people of his district—their struggles with the land and their unease with railroad and oil
companies and the ways in which these businesses siphoned their profits— as
fundamentally Populist concerns, so he addressed them as such and found success using
this platform. Though Sam was inexperienced, in the legislature, he found he had the an
“unteachable gift for...persuasion.”46 Ultimately, Sam was “one of the few legislators
who did not fail on a single measure.”47
1906 was a year of both great success and tumult in the life of Sam Johnson Jr.
Reelected to the Legislature, Johnson gambled too much and went back to his job
thousands of dollars in debt. His second term was not wholly unsuccessful; Sam wished
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to run for a third. Other viewed him as a hard-worker and hero for his refusal to
compromise Populist ideals. Ultimately, what destroyed Sam Johnson’s chances for a
long-lasting political career were these high ideals, for not all members of his district
were sold on his appeals to Populism and farmers. So, by the time Lyndon, his first child,
was born, “Sam Johnson had lugged his dreams and ideals back to Hill Country,” and
back to his wife, Rebekah Baines.48
It is important to examine Lyndon’s relationship with his father, a relationship
fraught with conflict, but at its core, a relationship of great admiration and respect. Much
of Lyndon’s behavior and motivations for behavior can be traced to the relationship he
shared with his father, a relationship that changed before and after his father lost the
Johnson family’s money.
In 1913 Sam and Rebekah Baines, Lyndon’s mother, moved their family to a
three-bedroom home in Johnson City. Johnson City was not a picturesque, wealthy, or
exciting town, but attempts by historians to make it seem the definition of poverty are
misguided. Sam Johnson was a successful man by Johnson City standards. When he
made money, he used it to purchase more markers of wealth and success. Sam bought
expensive boots, Stetsons, and the “biggest and most expensive car in the whole Hill
Country.”49 Image remained of utmost concern to Sam Johnson.
Most children seek attention, and in this respect, Lyndon Johnson was not unique.
There are countless stories told by a myriad of people who knew him in any and all
capacities to support this assertion. What is more important, however, is how Sam
48
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responded to Lyndon as a child. During Lyndon’s youth, Sam Johnson was a model of
fiery ambition and competitive spirit. Lyndon sought to emulate his father, and
succeeded in these ambitions by becoming even more competitive and aggressive than
his father.50 Sam Johnson was a natural politician who, along with his wife, cared deeply
about politics. He fostered an environment for his children where passionate political
discourse was the norm.
Sam Johnson returned to the Texas Legislature in 1918, but remained a farmer to
make his money. Sam began to deal in real estate and invested tens of thousands of
dollars into a land that was fundamentally unstable and difficult to cultivate.51 By 1922,
Sam Johnson was deep in debt. He could hardly grow cotton, and the cotton he could
grow would not sell because of reduced demand. 52 He had an enormous mortgage, and
owed the bank on money he borrowed to buy equipment for his farm. This failure broke
Sam Johnson as a man and changed him as a person. No longer was Sam Johnson a
respectable man in the eyes of the residents of Johnson City. In fact, the Johnsons became
“the laughingstock of the town.”53
The Johnsons were a family deeply concerned with image, and thus, were a
family of great pride. This economic fall, along with crippling his pride, changed how

50

Caro, Path to Power, 74.

51

Caro, Path to Power, 86.

52

High demand for cotton during World War I stimulated production, but a drop in prices after the war led
many tenants and sharecroppers to abandon farming altogether and move to the cities for better job
opportunities. In the 1920s, the federal government's control program cut acreage in half and foreign
countries who previously bought Texas cotton began to grow their own. Fred C. Elliot, "Cotton Culture,"
Handbook of Texas Online, http://www.tshaonline.org handbook/online/articles/afc03, accessed March 05,
2012.
53

Caro, Path to Power, 97.
28

Lyndon saw his father. No longer did he want to emulate his father. Instead, Lyndon
sought to escape the ruin his father brought upon the family. Lyndon went from carefully
watching and emulating his father’s every move to going out of his way to be
disobedient. Lyndon’s ambitions were not halted by this economic downfall; rather, the
economic fall was fuel for the flames of his burning desire to become important.
Lyndon’s sharpest defiance to his parent’s wishes was in regards to his education, an area
his parents found particularly important.54 For his first eight grades, Lyndon attended the
Junction School. For ninth grade, he went to the Albert School. Lyndon caused
disruption in the classroom, and often refused to do work, but teachers recognized his
brilliant mind.55 As he progressed in his schooling, he continued his contentious
relationship with his father which became wrecked with “an unusually violent strain of
competition.”56
In the spring of 1924, Lyndon graduated from high school. Desperately,
Lyndon’s parents begged him to attend college, a clear road out the Johnson City they
viewed through the lens of poverty. Lyndon, still angry, refused. Johnson refused to go
to college because college was important to his parents. He saw the value his parents
assigned to their high ideals and the importance of college in achieving these ideals. He
saw what this had gotten them, and rejected college. Instead of college, Lyndon went
west to California.
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During his time in California, Lyndon worked in his cousin’s law office and lived
in a “comfortable home.”57 Lyndon’s cousin Martin had an easy solution for Johnson’s
lack of education. He believed he could bypass several restrictions and make Lyndon a
lawyer without attending college at all. Ultimately this was not the case, and when
Lyndon found out, he returned to Johnson City as a man marked by the heavy weight of
disappointment, and possessing a new desire to secure an education that would lead to the
kind of future he imagined for himself.
To say The Southwest Texas State Teachers College at San Marcos was not a
college of high standards is incorrect. The Southwest Texas State Teachers College was a
college of lowest regard. To call it a college at all at the time Lyndon attended, in 1927,
requires a bit of hyperbole and suspension of disbelief. At San Marcos, he wrote for the
school paper. Johnson excelled at debate, and was greatly influenced by the debate
coach, H.M. Greene, who liked his ability to tear down the arguments of others. In 1928,
Lyndon’s financial status became too grim for continued attendance of college. He
dropped out of college to teach at a Mexican school in Cotulla, a job that paid $125 a
month.58
In Cotulla, Lyndon experienced a type of poverty he had never encountered. The
children in Cotulla had no lunch hour because they had no lunches to eat. In his work,
Johnson was described as “a teacher Cotulla had never seen.”59 Johnson was raised with
the (at the time) radical idea that ever person, right down to the struggling farmer, had

57

Caro, Path to Power, 125.

58

Caro, Path to Power, 165.

59

Caro, Path to Power, 167.
30

worth and deserved help to reach their potential. Johnson cared if these children learned,
and he devoted his intensity towards their education. Johnson wanted to be the best, the
most notable at everything he did. But there was something different in his teaching
years in Cotulla. This intensity and ambition was coupled with an equally fierce pity and
desire to help these poor children that can be tied to Johnson’s own experiences with
Populism.
As a teacher in Cotulla, Lyndon worked to secure better futures for the children at
his school. He purchased volleyball nets, sheet music for choir, and musical instruments.
He attempted to foster an environment of competition at the school, and provided his
students with opportunities to compete in “contests for spelling, speaking, and sports.”60
Lyndon encouraged other teachers at the school to become as involved in the lives of
their students as he was himself. There is no real explanation offered by any historian as
to why Johnson did these things for the children of Cotulla, and perhaps there is no true
explanation to be had. We will never understand Johnson’s complete motivations.
However, what we do know about Johnson’s early life suggests that though Lyndon had a
deep and powerful thirst for power and ambition, he also had some great desire to affect
positive change in the lives of others and the political background in Populism to do it.
According to Johnson himself, it was in Cotulla “that [his] dream began, of an
America...where race, religion, language, and color didn’t count against you.”61 Johnson
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dreamed of an America where the average person, any person, could succeed, and where
the government was willing to take action to help people succeed.
Lyndon returned to San Marcos College in 1929 and immediately entered campus
politics. Johnson campaigned his way to senior class representative of Student Council,
an election which he won by one, technically stolen, vote.62 This aggressive campaigning
was a preview of the Lyndon Johnson who would run for the Senate in 1948. It was at
San Marcos that Lyndon first discovered his willingness to do what it took to win, and it
was at San Marcos that Lyndon first won. The most important message to take from
Lyndon’s years at San Marcos is the early emergence of methods he would later use to
win more serious elections:
The desire to dominate, the need to dominate, to bend others to
his will—and the manifestation of that need, the overbearingness
with subordinates that was as striking as the obsequiousness with superiors
had been evident at San Marcos.63
This desire, this need, had to have come from something. Was it because of the cruelties
of the Hill Country that made Johnson into “a shape so hard it would never change?”64
Was it the Populist principles he was exposed to and carried with him during his time in
Cotulla? Ultimately, it was a combination of these factors coupled with a growing
awareness of what one must do, of the persona one must adopt, to successfully create a
national identity with which to dominate the American political landscape.
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After college, Johnson taught public speaking at Sam Houston High School.
Johnson ran his debate team with, in what had already become a recurring theme in his
life, boundless energy and soaring ambition. Lyndon threw his whole self into his team.
He had high standards for his pupils, and made sure they recognized he was the one who
held control and power. Johnson enjoyed his teaching job, but then he received a call
from newly-elected Congressman Richard Kleberg, who wanted Johnson as his private
secretary; Lyndon Johnson made his way to Washington.
Richard Kleberg was a wealthy man whose Congressional career is of little note.
He had little interest in politics, and felt out of place in Washington.65 Lyndon had a
sharp learning curve, and was among the most unsophisticated of the secretaries in
Washington. However, “once he knew how to do things in Washington, he started doing
them—with...frenzied, driven, almost desperate energy...”66 In fact, because Kleberg
simply didn’t care to do his job, once he found his footing, Lyndon was “congressman-infact. He ran the show.”67
As Kleberg’s secretary, Johnson began work unusually early, and left work
unusually late. Johnson was able to make significant impact in Washington because of
his hard work and convincing manner. People respected him, including his boss,
Congressmen Kleberg, who, though he did not believe in it, was persuaded by Johnson to
vote for the New Deal. Also notable in Johnson’s time as Kleberg’s secretary was his
takeover of the “Little Congress,” an organization of House secretaries. Johnson became
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speaker of the Little Congress, and through this duty, learned “a good deal about the
members of Congress—their enemies back home, drinking problems, and fears of the
next election.”68 Even as mere secretary. Johnson used others to his advantage and
gathered information that he recognized would be significantly helpful to his future.
His growing reputation allowed secretary Johnson to make valuable connections
that would serve his political career: “a network sprung up, a network of men linked by
acquaintance with Lyndon Johnson, who were willing, because of Lyndon Johnson, to
help one another.”69 Johnson created for himself a network of men who could and would
help him in Texas.
While acting as secretary to Kleberg, Johnson enrolled at Georgetown Law
School where he met his wife. Lyndon asked Claudine “Lady Bird” Taylor to marry him
the day they met. Lady Bird came from a comfortable family, and their marriage in 1934
was of political advantage to Lyndon because of the money that came with it. Lady
Bird’s entrance into Johnson’s life allowed him to make an important political ally: Sam
Rayburn. A friend of his father’s from the Texas Legislature, Rayburn was man with
whom Lyndon tried to cultivate a significant a relationship. These attempts were initially
fruitless because Rayburn said he would bring his wife to dinner with a single man.
However, after his marriage to Lady Bird, Lyndon could invite Rayburn to dinner.
Johnson succeeded in breaking down Rayburn’s walls, and Rayburn quickly
became something of a mentor and father figure to Johnson. Most importantly, Rayburn
was an activist on behalf of Lyndon Johnson. It was Rayburn who lobbied Texas Senator
68
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Tom Connally, who had a meaningful voice in selection of the position of Texas NYA
director.70 Connally agreed to Rayburn’s proposition of making Johnson NYA director,
but the White House refused to accept his recommendation. So Sam Rayburn went to the
White House, and though there is no record of what was said, with Rayburn’s help,
Lyndon Johnson was made the NYA director for the state of Texas.71
The National Youth Administration, or NYA, was established by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt as a part of his New Deal in 1935 to “give students jobs to
help them stay in school and to employ non-student youth in public works.”72 Johnson
saw many benefits to his new position, and chief among these benefits was that “he
could build local and state-wide contacts for future campaigns.”73 Johnson approached
his job as he had approached all others in his life. He demanded a great deal of his
employees, but he himself worked longer and harder than any of them. The NYA
program was on particular success in Texas.74
As leader of the NYA in Texas, Johnson planned schoolyard construction and
roadside parks projects that employed 15,000 youths in Texas. In a move that was
unusual for a Texas politician, but made sense in conjunction with the the populist ideals
Johnson believed in—that all of the people, and especially the little people, have worth
and deserve help—Johnson spread the benefits of the federal government’s assistance
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beyond color boundaries.75 Perhaps Johnson viewed his position with the NYA as a way
to build contacts, but this position also allowed him to help the disenfranchised. In what
would become another theme typical of his career, here, Johnson excelled in a position
that allowed him to help others using the power of government.
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Chapter Two:
The Creation of Myth: From the Frontier to John Wayne
Before one can begin an analysis of Lyndon Johnson’s use of cowboy and
western myth, which began nearly immediately after his time as NYA director in Texas,
one must first examine what precisely we mean when we say cowboy and western myth.
The words “western” and “cowboy” conjure powerful imagery in the minds of
Americans. To be a cowboy is to be entrenched in a particular narrative that has been
developed through literature and film in 19th, 20th, and 21st century America. Lyndon
Johnson understood these narratives and understood the strength they held. Johnson
knew that the cowboy narrative was a narrative accessible and appealing to all
Americans, regardless of race, gender, or class.
Critical to our discussion of cowboy and western mythology is the
frontier, that area of the American landscape that remained unsettled longer than any
other. Most important to the discussion of the importance of the American frontier is
American historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s seminal essay, The Significance of the
Frontier in American History. Speaking to the American Historical Association in 1893
at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago, Turner responded to a statement from
the U. S. Census of 1890 that stated the American frontier had closed.
Turner’s thesis proposed that the American frontier explained why
America developed in a distinctly different manner than European countries. He believed
the fluid frontier situation coupled with a population facing new and unpredictable
problems of the frontier not only forced them to be leaders, but also provided a variety of
unique effects on American society. Turner asserted that the frontier provided a type of
37

seeming boundless opportunity which prevented America from developing a class
consciousness and encountering an acute class struggle— a struggle pervasive in most
European countries. Turner’s thesis proposed that the frontier also produced a uniquely
American kind of democracy. Turner’s thesis is the base on which the idea of American
exceptionalism rests, and is the popular historiographic rationale for both “Republican
progressives and Democratic liberals.”76
Through Turner’s thesis, we see the influence the frontier had on political
thought and the emergence of political ideologies in America. However, perhaps more
powerful than even these ideologies is the mythology of the frontier, which is
fundamentally the mythology of cowboys and the West. The American frontier is the
mythic birthplace of democracy in the West. Texas contained frontiers longer than other
American states, so Texas took on a role as a place of mythic significance in the West.
Cowboys are real people and the West is a real place, but more important than these real
places and people that are exist are the mythic importance we assign to these places and
people. In this way, because of this mythic significance, cowboys and the West have
become much more than places and people. They are cultural touchstones, accessible to
nearly all people in America.
Myth is best defined as a story “drawn from a society’s history that have
acquired through persistent usage the power of symbolizing that society’s ideology and of
dramatizing its moral consciousness with all the complexities and contradictions that
76
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consciousness may contain.”77 Over long periods of time, and through retellings that are
passed through generations, these stories become “conventionalized and abstracted” until
they are reduced to “a deeply encoded and resonant set of symbols...”78 When we speak
of the cowboy and western mythology, we are referring to a specific set of symbols that
resonate with all Americans. When Americans hear the word “cowboy” or “western” or
“frontier,” they think of a specific set of images that color their understanding of an entire
historical context.
Fundamentally, myths exist to serve a culture. 79 Myths are a production of
society designed for the consumption of members of that society, so myths hold particular
power in the society in which they were conceived. As such, cowboy and western myths
have particular poignancy among Americans. Cowboy and western myths are pervasive,
and exist in both mass media and folk culture. Cowboy and western myths are at once
national and local. They are ideas rooted deep in the American consciousness, but are
ideas that also have strong significance in Texas folk culture.
We must be clear what we mean when we refer to western and frontier
mythology, for their are two myths of the frontier: a masculinized version: the myth of
violence, individualism, and self-reliance and a feminized version: the communityoriented, agricultural-focused strain of the myth. When we speak of western mythology,
we are speaking of these two narratives, both of which were important to Lyndon
Johnson’s political image and style.

77

Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 5.

78

Ibid.

79

Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 8.
39

The first of these frontier narratives is one of terrible violence. This
imagining of the violent frontier continues to provide patterns of identification and
legitimization for a violent streak in American society:
The savage enemy kills and terrorizes without limit . . . in
order to exterminate or drive out the civilized race (and) the
civilized race learns to respond in kind. A cycle of massacre
and revenge is thus inaugurated that drives both sides toward
a war of extermination.80
In this visioning of the frontier, frontiersman is gunfighter. The frontiersman is
concerned with domination, both of other cultures and of nature. The notion of a savage
warfare between frontiersman and Indian suggests a racist, and perhaps even genocidal
imperative. The frontiersman lacks a clear moral imperative. The frontiersman, in this
myth, takes on the role of morally ambiguous bandit. Fundamentally, this version of the
frontier myth is reliant on one critical assumption:
the conquest of the wilderness and the subjugation or displacement
of the Native Americans who originally inhabited it have been the
means to our achievement of a national identity, a democratic
polity, an ever-expanding economy and a phenomenally dynamic
and 'progressive' civilization.81
Also central to this system of belief was a heavy emphasis on the necessity of violence
through conquering other races to maintain social order for the greater good. According
to this version of the myth, we can only understand what it is that makes us Americans
through the lens of violence. We are asked to accept that our society is only successful
when it exerts power over individuals or groups of individuals that do not belong. This
myth asks Americans to honor the men that facilitate subjugation and dominance.
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This violent frontier myth has disturbing implications both politically and
for individuals. Whereas early settlers and frontiersman could achieve fulfillment and a
sense of progress through the conquering of new territories and annexation of new lands,
once the frontier was closed, Americans were forced to look for new sorts of conquests,
and this resulted in the discrimination and disenfranchisement of many groups of
Americans, including the poor, racial minorities, and immigrants.
Additionally, American political leaders used this frontier myth of violence
to justify involvement in foreign conflicts. With the Spanish-American War and
American involvement in the Philippines, President Theodore Roosevelt began the trend
of allowing the frontier myth to color the world of foreign relations. For Americans to
keep their sense of progress, Roosevelt suggested they must take up the challenge of
empire and bring civilization to third-world countries.
Later administrations would also invoke this violent frontier mythology to
justify their involvement in foreign affairs. Particularly relevant is the example of the
Johnson administration’s involvement in Vietnam. The Johnson administration used the
frontier myth of violence to rationalize and validate the United States’ escalation of
combat forces in Vietnam. This myth— that violence is permissible and even necessary
to secure the United States’ continued dominance in the world— was a powerful tool for
the Johnson administration to put a positive spin on unpopular policy decisions and
military tactics.82
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The feminized strain of the frontier myth, a more positive interpretation of
the cowboy spirit and the frontier, places emphasis on an individual’s ability to struggle
through a difficult environment. This myth is more localized than the frontier myth of
violence, and stresses the importance of working together and forming communities of
self-reliance. It focuses on the idea of bringing civilization to a place that has none, and
through this civilization, bringing order and a type of self-government that is willing to
help all people to be successful.
The creation of this mythic figure in the feminized strain of the myth, this
cowboy and frontiersman who rode into a town on his horse, and helped a community to
work together towards self-reliance, was largely created in Texas folk culture, a culture
that came to define America’s most central values. Though this myth still presented
cowboy and frontiersman as strong and capable of violence, in this interpretation of the
myth, violence was not emphasized as a force that was crucial to the domination of other
cultures and of nature. Rather, violence, in this form of the myth, is presented as a means
to an end, something to be avoided, but something that is justifiable if necessary. The
power of this western myth is that it does not celebrate violence; rather, it celebrates the
coming of civilization to a place.83
Where in the masculinized interpretation of the frontier myth there is
gratuitous and racialized violence for violence’s sake, in the second strain of the myth,
there is more emphasis on the figure of cowboy with a heightened sense of morality and
duty to a community. Additionally, it is in this form of the myth that symbols we
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associate with cowboys become meaningful. Frontiersman is not primarily presented as
gunslinger in this form of the myth. Instead, he is presented as rancher and cowboy,
someone who carries a gun, but would rather ride in on his horse and engage the enemy
in a less violent way.
In this feminized version of the myth there is a focus on the agrarian over
the Indian-hating gunfighter of the masculinized version of the myth. In this form of the
myth, there is respect afforded to men who value agriculture and the land. The focus is
placed on the man who acquires a title to a farm and raises his children to value and
respect the wilderness.84 In the feminized version of the myth the agrarian utopia is
emphasized: a place where farmers are valued and children grow up to respect the land
and continue an agricultural tradition. Implicit in the form of myth is a deep respect for
land and nature. There is no emphasis placed on domination or subjugation of others.
Rather, emphasis is placed upon the strength of the agricultural community, banding
together to create a place where civilization and nature can coexist. This kind of
“garden,” a nature fenced in by the cooperative civilization brought by farmers to a land
is a crucial element of the feminized strain of frontier myth.85
The masculinized frontier myth was a theme important to Johnson’s later
career and strategical decisions in Vietnam, and it provides the lens through which most
historians analyze Lyndon Johnson. However, the feminized strain of the frontier myth is
the myth from which Johnson drew in his early political career. If we ignore the hold that
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this first myth had on Johnson is his campaigns for Congress and the Senate, we ignore a
vital piece of Johnson’s history, explanation for his hold on the American public, and his
comfort with expressing ideals of cowboy masculinity in his work in politics.
The mythology of the frontier was largely created by those who were
outsiders to the frontier.86 As such, the origins of this folklore are complex and not
always entirely accurate. It is not necessarily accuracy that matters, however, for what is
disseminated in a culture— what all in a culture are exposed to in all forms of media,
sometimes in versions that are presented as fact—is what becomes true of a culture.
Cowboys did not conquer the frontier. Not all cowboys wore boots or Stetson hats.
However, because of mass media and folk culture’s dissemination of these myths, these
myths have become akin to historical fact.
It is also crucial to note that these western myths were also created and
widely disseminated through popular culture including pulp fiction, television, and film.
The first and most notable novel of the western fiction genre was Owen Wister’s The
Virginian. Written in 1902 and set in the Wild West, Wister’s novel was the first true
western written other than tiny dime novels. The novel describes the life of a foreman of
a ranch in Wyoming. It is narrated by an unnamed narrator, and chronicles that narrator’s
reactions to a rancher known simply as the Virginian. The character is terribly violent.
At one point in the novel, the Virginian must participate in the hanging of a cattle thief
who had been one of his good friends. The hanging is depicted as a necessary response
to the government's corruption and lack of action, so the Virginian carries through
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because of a sense of duty and obligation. The Virginian can also be read, however, as
the tale of a stakeholder coming into a territory and bringing civilization that is
uncorrupted by government influence to that territory. At once, pulp fiction could
embody both strains of the myth.
Wister’s work paved the way for future generations of writers to define the
narrative structure of the western genre. It is through these novels that the western
became formulaic. In particular, Zane Grey’s Riders of the Purple Sage contributed to
what Americans imagine when they think of cowboy. Grey wrote Riders of the Purple
Sage in 1912. The novel is set in Utah, so the force of antagonism in the novel is
religion, in this case, Mormonism. The character Lassiter, who dresses all in black and
rides in on his horse to restore order, is protagonist of the tale. Depicted as morally
ambiguous, Lassiter represents both virtue and vice at once.
Grey describes Lasseter as a gentle-voiced and sad-faced man who is a
hater and killer of Mormons. This description seems contradictory, but here we see the
contradictory nature of the cowboy narrative. In novels and narratives like The Virginian
and Riders of the Purple Sage, heroes of the story are not all good. Instead, they are
complicated human beings, at once morally upstanding and willing to kill to enforce
justice in a lawless land. Ultimately, we almost always view these heroes positively, and
there are greater implications in our world for this attitude. Because of cowboy tales, and
this cowboy narrative that includes violence, we learn to see violence as a necessary
means to an end, even for those that are morally upright and seek to bring order and
safety to a place.
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This narrative structure continued in movies of the 1900s for “from
roughly 1900 to 1975 a significant portion of the adolescent male population spent every
Saturday afternoon at the movies. What they saw were Westerns.”87 Lyndon Johnson
was one of these boys. Johnson descended from a long line of frontiersman. He lived an
authentic cowboy experience, but simultaneously he was exposed to the media’s portrayal
of the West, a portrayal than involved one man more than any other: John Wayne. The
most popular movie star in America, even after his death, was John Wayne.88 John
Wayne was the actor most synonymous with the western genre of film. His image will
forever be denotative of what it means to be a cowboy— that is, what it means to walk
and talk like a cowboy. Without John Wayne and the western films he made, there would
be no consistent pictorial representation of what it means to be a cowboy. John Wayne is
a major reason why the signifiers of the West are so significant to Americans. They are
all present in his portrayals of cowboys.
Perhaps most powerful in his portrayal is Wayne’s stance. When he
played a cowboy, Wanye looked unconquerable. Before Wayne, the figures that stood for
the west and the frontier experience, figures like Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett, Buffalo
Bill, were rooted in fact that turned into myth. Wayne’s portrayal of cowboy was entirely
rooted in myth, but for many Americans, became more true than an actual cowboy
experience. Wayne was so easily identifiable as a westerner that he became another
symbol of the West. When we think of the posture of a cowboy, we think of Wayne,
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Other actors need to be built up- by camera angles, lighting,
costume, blocking of crowds, suppression of others’ positionsin order to command the scene. Wayne’s power was such
that others had to be built up to give him credible opposition.
Wayne had a powerful on-screen presence. He was tall and strong, overwhelming on
screen. The Stetson hats he frequently wore only contributed to this height and feeling of
overbearingness. Fundamentally, the Western deals with the taming of the West, and
Wayne was a convincing tamer because of his inherent strength.
Additionally, Wayne had what looked like effortless control over his
enormous body. His actions, even actions that demonstrated enormous power, looked
casual and controlled. There is something overpoweringly sexual about the way Wayne
interacted with the western environment: the way he rode his horse and the way he stood
with his hands on his hips and pelvis thrust slightly forward. All of these actions worked
to draw attention to the fundamental feature of Wayne’s masculinity: his penis. There is
enormous power in this type of swagger. Wayne looked confident in his masculinity.
Wayne sexualized cowboy, and this sexualization added power to a myth already strong
in the minds of Americans. After Wayne, cowboy was firmly solidified as a masculine
role. The role’s physicality became just important as the narrative structure had been to
novels. To be a cowboy, a penis, and a pretty big one at that, was necessary.
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Figure 2: John Wayne

Wayne shows off his signature cowboy posture, Stetson on his head. steed behind him.89

It is also important to note elements of Wayne’s performance as cowboy
that became signifiers and symbols of what it means to be western. In his films, Wayne
always wore a large Stetson, adding height and a sense of masculinity. His feet were
constantly in cowboy boots, and he entered the scene on his faithful steed. He looked at
one with nature, almost like he grew out of the environment. To be a cowboy, at least in
Wayne’s sense of the word cowboy one had to be tough, hard, and unforgiving. These
symbols are powerful and resonant, because Americans saw them time and time again.
The reality of the these symbols does not matter. What matters is what they evoke, and
they evoke cowboy.
Westerns were accessible to Americans of all economic classes, age
groups, and genders. Because of this, Westerns, and cowboys, the heroes of Westerns,
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became the basis for imagining a national hero.90 Lyndon Johnson discovered this,
maybe really always knew it, and used it as the basis for the creation of a national
political identity, an identity that was so successful because it could reach all Americans.
Johnson knew western narrative. He knew the power of the feminized strain of the myth
he chose to emphasize—a group of resilient people, banding together working to achieve
the common goal of success for all. Additionally, Johnson’s image centered around the
symbols and signifiers of the west: a cowboy hat, cowboy boots, a horse, a ranch, and an
overwhelmingly masculine presence. We see this message come through loud and clear
in his campaigns for the House and Senate.
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Chapter Three:
First Defeat & Lessons Learned
By the time Roosevelt decided to run for a third-term, anti-New Deal sentiment in
Texas began to manifest itself in a number of strange ways. Perhaps the strangest
expression of this anti-New Deal sentiment came in the form of the political career of one
W. Lee “Pappy” O’Daniel. O’Daniel and his electoral success represented the power of
an appeal to the common people—a lesson Johnson should have learned from his early
exposure to Populist ideals. O’Daniel’s electoral victory against Johnson inspired in
Johnson an understanding of the benefits of a conscious manipulation of the ideals that
were so deeply entrenched in his being. Through his manipulation of language, image,
and use of new media to disseminate his message, O’Daniel exposed Johnson to a new
type of politician—one who valued image over message.
In 1937 when James Buchanan, a Congressman from the Tenth District of Texas,
died, Lyndon resigned from his post to run for the House Seat, thus moving from
administrative to electoral politics. Along the way, Johnson learned valuable lessons
about the nature of politics and the electorate—and Johnson was a fast learner. Alvin J.
Wirtz, a Texan who admired Johnson’s tenacity, was one of the most important advisers
to Johnson’s 1937 campaign. Once a member of the Texas Senate, Wirtz was a proponent
of FDR’s New Deal, and knew Johnson was an ideal candidate to express these ideals in
Washington.91
Central to Johnson’s strategy was running on a platform of the New Deal.
Nationally, Franklin Roosevelt was an overwhelmingly popular president. Johnson
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recognized any identification with a man so popular would be politically advantageous,
so from day one, he ran his campaign as a surrogate Roosevelt. He made clear he was the
candidate with closest ties to Roosevelt.
A close examination of the twenty-four radio addresses and speeches from the
1937 campaign available at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library & Museum in Austin,
TX, reveals a clear initial strategy at play—complete and total support of President
Roosevelt and the New Deal. In a full twenty of the twenty-four speeches he delivered
during the campaign, Johnson spoke to a platform with two planks: first, the needs of
every member of the tenth district, and second, unequivocal support of President
Roosevelt, his administration, and his policies.92 Johnson never attempted to support a
program not supported by the President, or even to distinguish himself in any meaningful
way from the President.
I believe this District should have as its representative in Congress
a man who is wholeheartedly committed to support of the President’s
entire New Deal program. Let me make it plain that I am for every
part of it...93
Johnson told the District he wanted to represent in no uncertain terms, he would represent
them as a sort of surrogate for the President, supporting issues the President would also
support. He focused on only the most national of issues, the New Deal.
Indeed, Johnson, in his radio addresses, made clear that the central issue of the
campaign, the only issue that mattered really, was full support for the President.
When we get down to the facts in the matter, there is only one
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issue in this campaign. Are you for the President, or against him?
Are you going to let the President down? The Tenth District
knows that. The Nation knows that. It awaits and expects a
thumping verdict: ‘We are for him. We won’t let the President
down.’94
Johnson’s strategy demonstrates that from very early in his career as a public political
figure, he recognized the importance of employing a particular political personality to
capitalize on a national mood. What is important to note here is that Johnson does not
delve into specifics of policy. Instead, he makes an emotional appeal to members of the
Tenth District centered around a very popular president. Here was Johnson’s recognition
of the need to run on a national platform. The political climate of the nation leaned
towards support of President Roosevelt, so Lyndon also supported President Roosevelt.
He won the election decisively.
The special election he won in 1937 for Congressman in the Tenth Congressional
District of Texas marked a turning point in strategy for Congressman Johnson. Before
and in 1937, it was advantageous for Johnson to run for office as a nationally-minded
political figure because of the enormous popularity of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and the depth of economic problems facing the nation as a whole. Johnson
was product of the New Deal era, an era of the creation of an America mindful of
primarily national issues. After 1937 however, Johnson fundamentally altered the way he
conducted politics for the rest of his life. What Johnson strove to do was turn local into
national. Fundamentally, Johnson sought to make the problems of the West the problems
of the nation.
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In 1937, Johnson’s support came from the land where he was born: the Texas Hill
Country, but also, perhaps more surprisingly, the rest of West Texas.95 Johnson must
have been pleased by this victory, but he also recognized that it was not a personal
victory in support of his own policies or western policies; rather, it was a victory for the
policies of President Roosevelt. However, Johnson also recognized he was situated in a
position where he could work to develop a new national strategy—a strategy to make
problems of the West problems of the nation. This was the strategy that would become
beneficial to Johnson in his manipulation of western and cowboy mythology. To solve
problems facing the West, Americans needed a cowboy.
Johnson, from Texas as he was, had a decision to make. He could present himself
as a southerner and vote with southern congressmen, or he could ally himself with the
growing western voting bloc in Congress. As a congressman, Johnson fought for his
constituents, and his efforts were focused primarily on problems that were traditionally
considered western, most particularly the issues of water and power lines: “the story of
Lyndon Johnson is the story of the electric wires...which linked the life of the West, as
railroad has linked its commerce, to the rest of America—for it was Lyndon Johnson who
brought those wires to the Hill Country.”96 Additionally, Johnson differed from his
southern counterparts on the issue of race. While it cannot be said Johnson was
progressive on issues of race, it is noteworthy that “as long as [Johnson] could not be
seem helping blacks...he helped them.”97
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Senate.

Johnson became more closely tied than ever to the presidency of Roosevelt upon
the backdrop of one of the greatest political feuds of the era: that of Roosevelt and his
Vice-President, John Nance Garner. In 1939, Garner disapproved of Roosevelt’s desire to
run for a third-term, and of his expansive government. The conflict intensified when
Roosevelt attempted to expand the size of the Supreme Court. Roosevelt’s appointments
to the enlarged court could have prevented the blocking of New Deal legislation.98
Roosevelt needed an ally powerful in Texas. A logical first choice might have been
Johnson’s mentor, Sam Rayburn. But Rayburn, out of longstanding loyalty to Garner,
would not support the President.99 Johnson ultimately ingratiated himself to the President
by becoming something of a spy in the delegation of Texas congressmen.
In Texas, Lyndon Johnson’s brand of liberalism, which supported the relief and
recovery programs of the New Deal, had not completely disappeared in the 1930s. Most
Texas congressman still supported rural electrification, conservation, and tax relief for
lower classes.100 Labor laws that came with the New Deal were frequently unopposed,
because they had little impact on the lives of rural Texans. In 1941, Johnson could afford
to run as a liberal Democrat because full blown conservatism—and the demands from oil,
gas, and other corporate interests that came with it—had not yet completely overtaken
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Texas.101 It is important to consider, however, that Texas possessed a relatively stable
economy, which aided to the conservative branch of the Democrats’ ascent to power in
the state. Less Texans were vulnerable and required the aid that New Deal programs
offered.
Johnson was “Roosevelt’s man in Texas—but he was not only Roosevelt’s
man.”102 Perhaps if Johnson had recognized this fact, his failed senatorial campaign in
1941 to fill the seat of the deceased Senator Sheppard would not have been unsuccessful.
Though Johnson may have had a growing network of support in Texas, this network of
support was not enough to help him win an election against a formidable opponent, one
whose successful campaign and recognition of the value of western mythology and Texas
folklore would help to solidify Johnson’s own national strategies: W. Lee “Pappy”
O’Daniel.
Johnson recognized his best strategy going into this race was to do what he had
done to be elected to the House: to tie himself as closely as possible to President
Roosevelt, who remained very popular in Texas.103 As he entered the 1941 election,
Johnson faced significant disadvantages. There were several candidates in the running
for the seat who had name-recognition throughout Texas. However, Johnson knew if he
tied himself to the President, he could quickly establish a name and viable platform.
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Johnson announced his candidacy for Senate on the steps of the White House.104 The
most important thing to take from Johnson’s strategy in 1941 is that “in 1941, as in
1937...the Johnson campaign consisted of a single issue: ‘Roosevelt, Roosevelt,
Roosevelt.’”105 Johnson gave speeches espousing his deep connection to Roosevelt, and
used as billboard a photo of he and Roosevelt shaking hands. Roosevelt himself played
an active role in the race, volunteering Harold Young, his Vice-President’s aid, to
Johnson’s campaign. Additionally, Johnson was not lacking in money, money which
primarily came from contracting and engineering firm, Brown & Root, who had worked
with and for Johnson in his years as congressman. Brown & Root won the contract to
build many of the power lines that electrified the Hill Country.106 Johnson was the reason
that Brown & Root had their contract, and they were understandably grateful. Though
Brown & Root could not legally contribute to the campaign, ultimately, they expressed
their approval of Congressman Johnson through the gift of hundreds of thousands of
dollars.107
Johnson struck a confident figure compared to the man who had run for office in
1937. He was more polished a candidate, wore “a fedora instead of a Stetson,” and
generally, attempted to look like he belonged in the Senate.108 Here was a Johnson who
did not attempt to appeal to any western base of support. He didn’t mention river
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projects, rural electrification, or agricultural issues outside of their relationship to the
New Deal. Instead, Johnson focused on letting his New Deal votes speak for him.
Johnson supported public power, work relief, conservation, and agricultural price
supports.109 Because his Roosevelt strategy worked for him in 1937, Johnson did not yet
recognize the need for a new strategy, nor the value of a more folksy approach. The
entrance into the race of Pappy O’Daniel, then Governor of Texas, changed everything.
Pappy O’Daniel was not a Texan by birth. Born in Ohio, O’Daniel spent much of
his early life in Kansas. Before his run for Governor in 1938, O’Daniel was a flour
salesman and radio personality. O’Daniel began writing jingles for the radio to sell his
flour, and eventually began writing songs that were not to sell flour, but were to honor
Texas, Texans, and the heroes of Texas: cowboys.110
In 1938, most Texans still lived on farms, and even those farm boys
who had recently arrived in the state’s fast-growing cities were still
farm boys, whose customs, tastes, vocabulary, and view of life were
those of country people. This view was simplistic, homespun, and
very, very firm. 111
In addition to hillbilly songs, on his radio show O’Daniel gave religious talks, lectured
listeners on morality, and recounted tall tales of Texan heroics.112 O’Daniel’s fans began
writing letters to him, begging him to run for Governor. Eventually, there were so many
requests that he asked people—in a broadcast on Palm Sunday, no less—to write to him if
they believed he would make a good Governor for Texas. O’Daniel received “messages
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from over fifty-four thousand people asking him to run, four advising him not to run.”113
O’Daniel announced his candidacy for Governor of Texas in May 1938.
By late June, it was apparent that O’Daniel’s political aspirations, which the
media assumed were ridiculous dreams, were not quite so far-fetched because of the
power of his populist message. O’Daniel successfully presented himself as an average
person who just happened to be concerned about the lives of other average people. He
recognized something powerful in the electorate that everyone else missed.
Accompanied by “his hillbilly band and the scripture,” he drew larger, more enthusiastic
crowds than any other candidate running for election. 114 The New York Times recorded a
conversation O’Daniel had with a man at a Fort Worth Rally. The man called him “a
Yankee carpetbagger from Ohio.” O’Daniel responded that he “came to Texas fifteen
years ago,” and emphasized that he came because “[he] wanted to be here, [he] wanted to
be one of you common folk.”115
O’Daniel presented himself as one of the people, even though he was not, and the
populist message mingled with religion resonated with voters116 O’Daniel made clear,
through his interactions with people, that he was “tired of politicians,” and added that
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“[he was] not one of them.”117 O’Daniel received a majority of the votes cast in the
election, eliminating the need for a runoff.118
Here, is perhaps the idea most fundamental to Johnson’s necessary shift in
strategy. Ultimately, O’Daniel prevailed in the 1941 election because he understood the
folk culture and long history associated with the frontier, Texas, and its people. He
understood the hold that mythic concepts, regardless of truth, had over the people of
Texas. This is something that everyone else missed. Arguably, O’Daniel created the first
true mythic campaign in American politics. O’Daniel represented the consumate
Washington outside, Johnson the insider. The outsider had an important lesson to teach.
Lyndon Johnson learned this lesson, and took this strategy to a national level. It is
important to understand, however, that Pappy O’Daniel did it first, and that Pappy
O’Daniel outmaneuvered even the cunning Lyndon Johnson in Texas. O’Daniel was
underestimated by everyone, and he still won.
O’Daniel found strength in the farmers of Texas. He used a fatherly voice and
religious undertones to maintain his wide appeal. O’Daniel presented himself as a true
Texan, above politics, and just one of the “common citizens.”119 These sorts of appeals
sound strikingly like the appeals Johnson would use in later campaigns, not at all similar
to the Lyndon Johnson present in the 1941 senatorial election.
Before O’Daniel entered the race, Johnson was all business: buttoned-up suits and
fancy neckties. After he realized the source of O’Daniel’s popularity, however, Johnson
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changed tactic. Johnson tried, unsuccessfully to become more like Pappy O’Daniel.
Gone were the days of espousing the policies of Roosevelt and Roosevelt only.:
...the dark suits of had been replaced by Texas white; the jackets
of the suits hung open, or were taken off, exposing sweat-stained,
rumpled shirts; his neckties were the ties of the Hill Country again,
not of Capitol Hill...the unfashionably short mail-order neckwear of
the countryman; their knots, loosened in the heat of campaigning,
dangled from an open, sweat-wilted collar.120
After O’Daniel, Lyndon simultaneously became an advocate for farmers, drew
upon his “country boy” roots, and attempted to maintain support for President Roosevelt
and the New Deal. Through populist appeals, he tried to remind the people of the Tenth
District that he was one of them: a country boy from simple roots. He wanted them to
know that he understood the importance of farmers and ranchers. He tried to relate to
them in the way the O’Daniel so successfully related to them in his campaign for
Governor. At the same time, he remained conscious of the national mood of the country.
He never completely dropped the message that he stood behind Roosevelt, and that was
the driving force of his campaign. At once, he encouraged farmers and ranchers to
democracy, and rallied them around a national figure, President Roosevelt.
In my country-boy way of thinking, there is nothing so democratic
in the whole world as a meeting like this, where our farm and ranch
and town people are gathered together...to show America and the
whole world that you are one hundred percent behind Roosevelt and
unity and Lyndon Johnson.121
In his radio addresses from June, the very month O’Daniel’s support began to
swell, Johnson began to us western and farm-related talking points with increasing
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frequency, abandoning a strategy that focused solely on solidarity with Roosevelt and the
New Deal.122 Johnson enumerated the problems of the west, and showed personal
concern with the problems of his constituents, something he did not do in the election he
won in 1937. He empathized with the real, daily life problems of his would-be
constituents. Johnson knew of the significance soil, water, rural electrification, and
livestock had with these people. So he borrowed from O’Daniel’s tactics and began to
use western populism
We don’t talk jobs and labor problems and rural electrification,
and flood control, soil conservation, farm interest rates, and
sheep, goats, cattle, and hogs, like something that exists somewhere
else, because all those things are daily bread for us and when
something goes wrong with them we don’t eat.123
In the same radio address, and in several others delivered later that week, Johnson
implored voters not to “vote for hillbilly music,” but instead, to “vote for the man whose
record shows you he’ll do the most for you.”124 This was a direct attack against O’Daniel
and his folksy approach. Clearly, if Johnson felt it necessary to attack O’Daniel on style,
he understood the value of this style. At this stage, however, Johnson’s primary concern
remained full support of Roosevelt and the national agenda of the day.
Johnson’s last address, delivered immediately before election night, is notable in
that it both pays thanks to mythic western figures, and ends with its emphasis on
Roosevelt. Johnson argued that farmers and ranchers, figures of mythic importance, were
on his side, and not O’Daniel’s in the campaign. He goes on to say that these men have
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set an example for all of America. He made the appeal that these men, their code of
ethics, their standards of living, their ideas of what is right in politics, are ideas that the
nation at large should adopt. Johnson took western symbols and tried to make them
symbols of national significance. Importantly, however, Johnson ended this campaign
with an appeal to national unity and Roosevelt noticeably tacked on to the end of his
speech. This is a reflection of Johnson’s discomfort with completely abandoning a
platform he knew was national, a platform he was certain of the country’s faith in.
Tonight I humbly thank the farmers and ranchers who,
recognizing the peril we face, have worked day and night in this
campaign. I thank the laboring men of Texas...They have set a
standard for all America to copy. They believe in Roosevelt and
unity and Lyndon Johnson.”
Johnson lost the election by a margin of only 1,311, almost certainly stolen
votes.125 126 The election represented a crucial shift in strategy for Johnson. For the first
time, Johnson recognized that Pappy’s western persona, his appeals to farmers, cowboys,
and the working people of Texas, meant more than his own promises to stand behind
Roosevelt. In the end, it proved more important to talk about how you were one of the
people than to talk about what you could do for them. Johnson recognized the connection
between these appeals, myth, and the populist ideals he had internalized his entire life.
The national mood was not static, and currently, the national mood was changing. Heads
were turning westward. In this election, Johnson saw the importance and potential
national resonance of local politics. Pappy O’Daniel won a senatorial campaign with

125

Caro, The Path to Power, 740.

126

Unluckily for Johnson, O’Daniel’s supporters were of the particularly fervent variety and “stole the
election for him.” Conkin, Big Daddy from the Pedernales, 105.
62

local politics. Perhaps, if used properly, there would be no limit to what local politics,
and particularly western politics, could achieve in Johnson’s capable hands.
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Chapter Four:
1941-1947:
Politics, Patriotism, and the Solidification of a National Image
Lyndon Johnson did not accept defeat easily. He later recalled the months after
his defeat at the hands of folksy Pappy O’Daniel as “the most miserable in [his] life.
[He] began to think about leaving politics and going home to make money.”127 Of
course, Johnson was prone to exaggeration, so we may never know if this was a real
feeling of discouragement or simply a story designed to add to the mythology of a
cowboy who overcame terrible obstacles. What we do know, however, is how Johnson
responded to defeat. Recovering quickly, he made decisive changes to create a new
image in national politics. In 1941, Johnson discovered Franklin Roosevelt’s blessing
was no longer enough to win in Texas. He also found, however, that cowboy and western
mythology, the symbols he was raised with and the values that were born in him, could be
used to great effect in Texas. It was during this period that Johnson began to consciously
and successfully manipulate symbols and values of the frontier, ideas he had internalized
his entire life. Johnson emphasized more strongly than ever before the important role
that the frontier myth of community and cooperation could play in politics.
Lyndon Johnson was Franklin Roosevelt’s man through and through—until
association with Roosevelt became politically disadvantageous. Johnson’s loyalty to
Roosevelt in his 1937 and 1941 campaigns cannot be overemphasized; Roosevelt’s New
Deal platform was the only platform with which Johnson was concerned. In 1937, this
strategy was incredibly effective because the New Deal was overwhelmingly popular in
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Texas. It is important to note, however, that by 1941, there were significant opponents of
the New Deal in Texas. As early as July 1941, anti-Roosevelt Democrats formulated
plans to defeat New Dealers in 1944. 128 Deep divisions in the Texas Democratic Party
based largely on negative response to New Deal economic philosophy that involved
heavy federal spending, led to a fear among Roosevelt supporters that Texas would be
decisive in preventing President Roosevelt’s fourth term.129
O’Daniel succeeded in 1941 by tapping into this sentiment. But he was also able
to anticipate the mood of Texans and tap into their own myths to reach them. O’Daniel
realized something that even Johnson did not—the significance of making Texans feel
not only that a politician should work for them, but also that he himself was one of them.
Crucial to this concept was Texas folk-culture, and in this area, O’Daniel was a master.
Johnson needed to learn to adapt.
In 1942, Johnson, no longer discouraged, was in good shape to face O’Daniel
again, this time in the Democratic primary for O’Daniel’s full six-year term. Johnson’s
plans, however, were derailed by Pearl Harbor. At the outbreak of war, Johnson pledged
to serve, which made running in the 1942 primary an impossibility. He would wait until
1948 for his next chance at the Senate This six-year gap gave Johnson an important
chance to cultivate his populist and cowboy image through his politics in Congress.
In the summer of 1942, Johnson took an approved leave of absence from his
House seat and entered the Navy to work on “production and manpower problems” that
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were slowing the nation’s output of planes and ships.130 Johnson was assigned to the
Under Secretary’s office and took responsibility for production of military vehicles on the
West and Southwest.131 We see strains of frontier mythology in Johnson’s sense of duty
to the President in his task, for he believed that if he only had the authority, he had a
working solution to the problem, which involved group effort and cooperation. This
group effort and cooperation is precisely what we mean when we speak of the feminized,
agrarian version of frontier myth. Johnson brought his belief in this myth to his work in
the Navy.
Johnson’s boredom led him to a decision to seek a larger, more personally
meaningful role in the war that had derailed his political prospects. With wife Lady Bird
supervising his Washington office, Johnson won an uncontested victory in the
Democratic primary for his House seat and was sent, by direct order of President
Roosevelt, to the Southwest Pacific front.132 Through his service, Johnson got a taste of
combat that tested his cowboy mettle and gave him a new story to add the the personal
mythology he aimed to cultivate. This story emphasized the depth of his commitment to
the most important community he was a member of—The United States of America.
Even in his military career, internalized aspects of the frontier myth were clearly
evident in Johnson’s behavior and opinions about particular policies. Through his
experiences in the military, Johnson had the opportunity to rub shoulders with incredibly
powerful men, including General Douglas MacArthur. Johnson became a major advocate
130
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of MacArthur’s military strategies, including the idea that the Southwest Pacific needed
more men and supplies.133 In short, Lyndon the cowboy sought to bring civilization to a
place where there was little, evoking the feminized version of the frontier myth.
However, simultaneously Johnson expressed the masculinized version of the myth, where
“savages” were not entitled to natural rights belonging to “people,” but America could
and should do its part to help to civilize these savages using whatever means necessary.134
Perhaps the most notable story from Johnson’s days at war was his participation
in an air raid that earned him a Silver Star. Johnson and two Army officers went to the
22nd Bomb Group base, which was assigned the high risk mission of bombing the
Japanese airbase at Lae in New Guinea. A colonel took Johnson's original seat on one
bomber, and it was shot down with no survivors. Reports vary on what happened to the
B-26 Marauder carrying Johnson. Johnson recalled the B-26 was also attacked by
Japanese fighters but survived, while others, including other members of the flight crew,
claim it turned back because of generator trouble before reaching the objective and before
encountering enemy aircraft, a perspective which is supported by official flight records.
Other airplanes that continued to the target did come under fire near the target at about
the same time that Johnson's plane was recorded as having landed back at the original
airbase.135
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Johnson was the only one of the participants of his air raid of similar rank and
experience that received a medal for the mission. He felt deeply self-conscious about
receiving the medal.136 Some thought that Johnson might refuse the medal, as it was
fairly straightforwardly undeserved by the typical standards of a Silver Star.137 If we
know one thing that is deeply embedded in Johnson, however, it is his desire to play the
hero. The honor of the Silver Star and the credibility it could add to the growing cowboy
mythology he sought to surround himself with was temptation too compelling to
overcome. So the Silver Star became part of the tale, a largely exaggerated and mostly
untrue part of the tale, but an important part of the mythos nonetheless.138
When Johnson returned to his House seat late in 1942, he recognized a shift in
public opinion in Texas, a shift against President Roosevelt that could have potentially
disastrous consequences to his own political future. In Texas, this shift was most
fundamentally a growing resentment from farmers directed at rationing and bureaucratic
red tape, clear symbols of a Federal government grown increasingly large at the hands of
Roosevelt and the New Deal.
Johnson, concerned with his image, moved to align himself with this new, more
conservative Texas opinion. In a speech in December of 1942, Johnson criticized the
136
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bureaucracy and Roosevelt at once. The speech was both a direct appeal to the people of
the 10th Congressional District of Texas and a pointed criticism of the Federal
government as run by President Roosevelt. Johnson condemned Roosevelt’s “overstuffed” government and identified several New Deal Programs worthy of criticism by
name: the Public Works Administration (PWA), the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA), and the Works Project Administration (WPA). This was a specific and pointed
critique of policies that just one year earlier received complete support and made up the
entirety of Johnson’s platform against Pappy O’Daniel.

...What about over-staffed, over-stuffed government that worried
along like a centipede—too good in the production of limbs and not
good enough in the production of arms...What about the rationing
that has gone irrational, about administrators who spend too much
time laying down law to us and not enough time reading up on on
the law? ...With our shoulders to the wheel of war against foreign
enslavement, those old domestic pieces, the PWA, the FHA, and
WPA are now in the way...The social gain that we are very busy
preserving at this moment is our status as free men in a free
nation.139
Additionally, in this particular speech, Johnson spoke directly to the concerns of
the people when he mentioned rationing gone irrational. He criticized lawmakers and
government officials so concerned with exercising and over-stepping their own authority
as to become blind to the concerns of real people. In this criticism, Johnson sent a clear
message to his constituents, a message that he was not like these men. His criticisms
emphasized that he was one of the average people and shared their concerns. This idea of
establishing a connectivity and closeness— a sense of oneness with constituents and a
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recognition of the appeal of populism— was a lesson that Johnson learned loud and clear
in 1941 from Pappy O’Daniel.
When delivered, the speech received considerable press and firmly reestablished
Johnson in a favorable light in Texas politics. It became something of a blueprint for
what became common themes of Johnson’s public statements in 1943.140 At the start of
the year, Johnson launched a campaign to use American manpower more efficiently in the
war effort. Johnson supported the same view that most Americans and Texans also
supported—that labor unions were actively and selfishly hindering war production so that
full potential was not reached. At first, this idea does not seem to evoke any strain of
cowboy mythology. In fact, however, this idea is complimentary to the frontier myth of
cooperation. Here, Johnson displayed his belief in the cooperation of all Americans,
labor unions and corporations included, to reach a common goal.
In the war efforts of 1943, Johnson, from his position in Congress, advocated for
a more regimented, controlled, cooperative, and effective use of manpower. Johnson,
concerned by a Time magazine report that absenteeism at American factories was
seriously hindering the country’s ability to produce war vehicles and ammunition, offered
an amendment to a Navy Department Bill requiring shipyards to file quarterly reports on
absenteeism statistics. This amendment worked to ensure American workers felt duty to
their place of employment and to America’s war efforts. It placed emphasis on the idea
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that we, as American citizens, should hold one another accountable for successes and
failures alike.
Though Johnson’s absenteeism bill was shelved, it lead directly to his
appointment to chair a Naval Affairs subcommittee whose aim was to investigate whether
person in the Naval Department were “pursuing the war effort efficiently, expeditiously,
and economically.”141 Here we see, again, Johnson’s desire to encourage communityoriented success and to hold people accountable for communal failures.
In 1943 and 1944, Johnson walked a tightrope—supporting the Roosevelt
administration’s war efforts and criticizing their New Deal and big government policies at
once. This move reflected Johnson’s recognition of the importance of the Texas
conservatives in his district. Johnson feared such divisions and did not like to be linked
to either side. Publicly, Johnson shunned his label as a liberal Democrat. However,
Johnson recognized the importance of countrywide cooperation in war efforts and
remained loyal to welfare programs and economic regulations that helped those
struggling in a post-war economy. Also important to note are Johnson’s economic
appeals to his constituents. In January 1944, Johnson told the Texas Legislature:
[Roosevelt is] for free enterprise. I’m for local self-government. [He’s]
against centralizing power in Washington...but then [he] thought about
free enterprise and about concentrating powers of government in
Washington and about local self-government. And [he] reached this
conclusion: [he wants] to substitute for free enterprise equal opportunity.
Every man who has gone through a living Hell for you and for
me, and comes out with scars on his body and his soul to show for
it shall have an equal opportunity to get a job when this is over.142
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Johnson evoked the feminized frontier myth when he said he would “leave it to the local
community to assume this responsibility,” but also said that if the community failed to act
on this, that he would vote for legislation to make this possible.143
At the beginning his speech, Johnson lent support to “local self-government,” not
necessarily an ideal one associates with liberalism, but certainly one we associate with
the frontier. Johnson offered approval towards groups of citizens who brought order to
their own place, as opposed to Roosevelt’s large scheme of government, which forced its
order on every town. While not a complete and total rejection of Roosevelt’s policies,
this showed Johnson’s strong desire to create a connection with the people in his district,
an emphasis on populism he learned from O’Daniel. Johnson emphasized the connection
of all people to their place, and their responsibility for bringing government and order to
that place. He also worked to explain the importance of community recognition of
heroism and patriotism.
Though Johnson did support many of the Roosevelt Administration’s wartime
policies through 1944, it is important to understand why.144 Whereas in the past,
Johnson’s support of Roosevelt’s policies was blind and aimed at the creation of a
popular national identity, by 1944 a shift occurred. Johnson felt a real sense of duty
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towards the war effort, a sense of duty that harkened back to the ideas and myths about
the frontier that surrounded him as he came to an age of political maturity.
Due to his belief in the power of community, Johnson was willing go against big
Texas interests. Johnson remained strongly opposed to wartime profiteering, even where
oil was concerned. Oil was king in Texas, but in a situation where Johnson stood to make
a great deal of money, he was more concerned with preserving the interests and integrity
of the nation as a whole. In short, he was interested in working as a community for the
benefit of that community. A committee Johnson chaired in June of 1944 voted that all
naval oil reserves should be in strict service to the American Fleet. Again, in July 1944,
Johnson voted against the interests of big oil and with the interests of the country at large,
against a thirty-five cent increase in the price of crude oil. 145
Political insiders in Texas feared this approach would not be advantageous to
Johnson’s political prospects. Tom Miller, Mayor of Austin in 1944, wanted Johnson to
denounce oil rationing. Instead, Johnson gave a speech denouncing people like Miller,
the people in Texas who “...would withhold petroleum from our armed forces to use it at
home.”146 Johnson rejected the special interests of Texas in favor of evoking strains of
Texas mythology: the belief that by working together, a community could overcome even
the most seeming insurmountable of opponents, in this case, a terrible war overseas.
Johnson felt comfortable about his political prospects in 1944 because the
majority of party leaders in Texas still supported Roosevelt and his New Deal policies.
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However, there was a growing movement of so-called “Regulars,” the conservative face
of the Democratic party in Texas, who sought to take back control of the party. Led by
Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones, Senator Pappy O’Daniel, and hundreds of powerful
oilmen, the Regulars appealed to the concerns of an average Texan: heavy governmental
control and rationing of commodities essential to the success of Texas. The Regulars
wanted the state Democratic convention to select independent presidential electors for the
Democratic column on the ballot who would decline to cast their electoral votes for
Roosevelt in an effort to throw the election into the House of Representatives, where the
South (and anti- New Deal sentiment) would have the numerical advantage.147 The plan
failed, but Texas Regulars remained an organized group who advocated for “restoration
of states’ rights and white supremacy.”148 The Regulars vehemently opposed labor
unions and the New Deal. Ultimately, after Roosevelt’s reelection, the liberal faction of
the party prevailed.
In 1945, Johnson’s political fortunes remained inextricably linked to the presence
of President Franklin Roosevelt in the White House. Though his platform was no longer
one of blind support for Roosevelt’s platform and New Deal policies, Johnson was still
seen, at least in Texas where it mattered most, as Roosevelt’s man. At Roosevelt’s
passing, in April of that year, Johnson felt a profound sense of grief. But Roosevelt’s
death influenced the development of Johnson’s policies and belief system. Now fully
free to move away from support of the President, Johnson focused on development his
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own national identity. Roosevelt’s passing, while a deep loss for all Americans, did not
mean the end of his ideas and programs. Johnson came of political age during the New
Deal era and as such, became a bearer of the New Deal legacy. Now, Johnson was free to
mold these New Deal ideas about the power of helping and the power of community to
his Texas and frontier ideals.
The period between Roosevelt’s death and Johnson’s next run at the Senate can be
summed in a single word: uncertainty. Johnson lost a man central to the crafting of his
political identity. He felt unsure of where to go next. In this period of confusion, more
than ever, Johnson fell back on images he had so deeply internalized his entire life, both
consciously and unconsciously. He fell back upon the frontier myths of cooperation and
opportunity for all.
Johnson, in this post-war, post-Roosevelt era, voted using his frontier sensibilities.
Johnson espoused government activism on behalf of the disadvantaged. He voted to
support members of his community that had sacrificed. Johnson spoke and voted for bills
aimed to help veterans of the war. He supported President Truman’s bill for maximum
employment of combat veterans and voted for legislation aimed to alleviate housing
shortages due to the moratorium on new home building that occurred during the war. He
voted to continue price control laws to prevent the reoccurrence of the cycle of economic
distress that happened post-World War
Johnson’s opponent in the 1946 Congressional election was Hardy Hollers, a
Texas Regular and decorated Army veteran who placed heavy emphasis on his war
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record. Hollers also emphasized the issue of “honesty in government.”149 He alleged
Johnson had people all over Texas—administrators, oilmen, even postmasters—in his
pocket working for him. Certainly some of Hollers’ accusations were justified, but they
are just one piece of the puzzle. More relevant to our analysis, however, is how Johnson
reacted. Johnson responded to Hollers’ accusations by fully transforming his political
image, once and for all, into a cowboy, both in rhetoric and appearance. Johnson showed
that he was one of the common people, a Texas man just like the Texas men and women
he represented.
Johnson’s campaign took him to each of the ten counties of his district. Before he
spoke, a four piece band, aptly named “Johnson’s Hill Billy Boys,” drove around town
encouraging people to come hear Lyndon speak.150 Even before people heard him speak,
this band all but guaranteed that they would have the cowboy myth at mind when
thinking of Lyndon Johnson. At some appearances, actor Gene Autry appeared, sang the
song “I’m Back in the Saddle Again,” and urged voters to put Lyndon back in the saddle,
where he belonged. 151
Johnson’s western, cowboy persona also shined through in his rhetoric. Johnson
used pure, tough-talking, American cowboy language and said he would fight anyone off
who tried to take away freedom. The image evoked is not necessarily an image of
violence; rather, it is an image of being willing to stand for a place and to not allow
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unlawful forces to rip that place from the hands of those who have ownership of that
place.
That’s one of the many good things about us Americans. There’s
not ever anybody going to take away our American privilege of
blowing off steam. We’ll fight ‘em before we’d stand for that. And
we’d whip ‘em. Just like we always have.152
Johnson didn’t just talk in rough and tumble generalities about place and the
defense of place. He also evoked images of a particular place: the Hill Country of
Texas. Johnson spoke of a special, western, and frontier-like place specifically. He
placed this geographic location at the top, and implied that this place was the very
embodiment of what it meant to be American. Johnson used pure and natural imagery.
He implied that this part of Texas represented something special, and that the people that
lived there had something important to do and say. He linked the image of natural purity
to something that was positive about this place.
You know, it’s always a great thrill to come back to Johnson City
and the Hill Country. There isn’t any question about it: up in the hills,
the sun shines brighter...the air is fresher...and the clouds are less troubled
that anywhere I know of.153
Johnson also moved to criticize the Texas Regulars and make them appear to be
the ones distanced from the people of the Tenth District. Johnson diminished the power
of the Texas Regulars by labeling them mere “clique.” Johnson used a guilt trip
evocative of the frontier, calling out these men for selling out to their community and
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their neighbors. In Johnson’s frontier mindset, these men represented the opposite of
what it meant to be a strong leader. These were the men that brought ruin to
communities because crucially, Johnson believed that the power of community spirit
could bring people together to work to achieve a common goal. Additionally, Johnson
distanced himself from big oil and big industry. In doing so, at once he made himself
resemble a common man and attempted to rally others around him to work together,
without the help of these traitorous men and businesses.
Now on the receiving end of that order from Big Oil, there is a
clique of men here in the Tenth District of Texas, men who have
sold out their community, their neighbors, and themselves. I think
you will understand me when I speak of that clique of men that get
their orders from Big Oil, I think you will know what I mean when
I call them Little Grease. Big oil...is too big for our district...it is
even too big for our state.154
Johnson also used rhetoric to establish the Tenth District as a place of literal
mythic significance. Through his words, it seemed as if this district was the place of
origin for the myth itself.
Men came to these 10 counties from nearly every nation on the
earth’s face. Their grandfathers settles in Johnson City when the
Indians were still there.155
Johnson took listeners through his district’s history, back to the glory days when the
frontier was still open and the men were still bravely facing the Indians and making
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cowboys of themselves. He established the district as a place of great importance, and
invoked in those listening, a sense of history and a sense of place.
They were the people who met in Noah Byer’s blacksmith shop
and wrote the Texas Declaration of Independence. They wrote it
not because they believed men must have war, but because they
believed men must have peace. 156
Listeners had a sense of a place with hundreds of years of history. Additionally, and
interestingly, Johnson rejected the frontier myth of violence. He emphasized the
peacefulness of these original settlers of Texas. He emphasized the fact that they brought
peace and not war to this place. He appealed to the community-oriented strain of the
frontier myth.
And everywhere I have gone, I found the same kind of folks who
live in Central Texas. Men who want no more than a job, the right
to worship as they please, the right to have schools for their children,
and churches and homes. 157
Johnson concluded by reminding the people of his district of who they are, most
fundamentally, as a population. They are people who just want peace. They are people
who just want the very basic elements of civilization. Johnson also said that these are the
people he found everywhere. This is important, for this is where Johnson attempted to
make the move from Texas politics to national politics. Johnson emphasized that the
values of Texas, the fundamental values of the people of the Tenth District of Texas, were
the fundamental values of the nation as a whole. Johnson called values of his
community-oriented strain of frontier mythology values of the nation as a whole. In this
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campaign, and through this rhetoric in particular, we see the first inklings of Johnson’s
recognition of the national power held by in frontier mythology.
On July 27, 1946, Johnson won a decisive victory in his battle against Hollers.158
However, just as Johnson recognized the power of the frontier mythology he used in his
campaign, he also recognized that New Deal fervor was losing hold around the nation,
and especially in Texas. Truman’s low levels of popular support and the Republicans’
gains in the House and Senate in 1946 marked a sea change in American politics forced a
shift in political ideology and campaign strategy that defined the remainder of Johnson’s
political career.
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Chapter Five:
1948 Battle on the Frontier & Beyond:
Solidification of National Identity Through Dissemination of Myth
Of Johnson’s time in the Senate, fellow Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois said,
“first of all, physically, Lyndon Johnson is a very impressive person...when you heard
him on the floor, you thought of him in terms of somebody who had real stature.”159
Katharine Graham, personal friend of Johnson, said he “just got things done,” and added
that it was “his Texas personality that did it.”160 Johnson is widely considered the most
powerful Senate Majority Leader of all time, and his manipulation of cowboy and
western mythology had much to do with how he came to this position. In becoming
Senator and Senate Majority Leader, Johnson became a man with a persona—a persona
almost entirely reliant on the power of mythology. In Johnson’s most heated campaign
for the Senate, he called upon his farm-friendly voting record and more importantly upon
his western persona, to win everything he had been working for his entire life—a seat in
the Senate representing Texas.
Lyndon Johnson’s 1948 Democratic primary race against Coke Stevenson has
been discussed in great detail. Literally hundreds of books have been written about the
electoral battle. Here, however, we are specifically concerned with the cultivation of
Johnson’s image that occurred between 1946 and 1948. The majority of Johnson’s
biographers acknowledge that a change in Johnson’s image occurred before he ran for the
Vice-Presidency.161 Few, however, recognize the extent of the transformation that took
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place in the 1948 election. The differences we see between 1941 and 1948 offer the
picture of a man deeply concerned with turning real features of his life into images
consciously and strategically used to political advantage.
In 1941, Pappy O’Daniel left his Senate seat, and Johnson decided to make a
run.162 Johnson’s decision to run in 1948 and not in 1942 was largely tied to new heavy
financial support from friends and oilmen George and Herman Brown.163

His decision

was decisive, and it had to be—to run for this seat Johnson was forced to give up his seat
in the House of Representatives. Here, Johnson demonstrated great confidence in his
own political future and the power of myth.
Johnson’s opponent in the Democratic primary, Coke “Calculating Coke”
Stevenson, remains a legend in Texas, even today. Stevenson served as governor of
Texas longer than any previous governor. Stevenson was as authentically Texan as men
come. Born in a log cabin, he “campaigned almost entirely in the style of the Old
West.”164 Stevenson was perhaps the best embodiment of the rugged, violent,
individualistic strain of the frontier myth that Texas politics had ever seen. His belief in
limited government made him an icon for the conservative faction of the Democratic
party in Texas.
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Ultimately, the battle in 1948 was about Texas at a crossroads in terms of political
ideology. The election pitted against each other two men who could not have been more
different in terms of both campaign style and their opinion of what the Democratic party
should be in Texas. Stevenson was simplistic in his approach to campaigning. The tall
man who frequently smoked a pipe felt comfortable one on one with people, and in fact,
his nephew later recalled that “he wasn’t a backslapper. He couldn’t work a crowd.”165
He was old-school politics. Stevenson rejected media and spectacle, preferring instead to
drive county seat to county seat, delivering speeches to small groups of constituents.166
Stevenson’s campaign represents the last traditional, pre-media campaign waged in a
rapidly urbanizing Texas. Stevenson was a true westerner and a real life rancher. He had
the experience and the myth in his hands. Lyndon Johnson won in 1948 because he
recognized the importance of use and dissemination of the myth on a large scale. The use
of radio and of helicopters by the Johnson campaign to reach citizens all over the state of
Texas was critical in the outcome of the election. Lyndon Johnson, for perhaps the very
first time in his political career, understood the full power of cowboy and western
mythology used on a national scale.
During the campaign, Johnson balanced on a tightrope. He still had support from
the liberal faction of the Texas Democratic party, however, the election with Stevenson
was so heated that he knew he would also have to woo a significant portion of the Texas
Regulars, the states rights advocates and conservative faction of the Democratic party in
Texas, to win. To do this, Johnson endorsed, wholeheartedly, the anti-labor Taft-Hartley
165
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act, which was heavily supported by Texans. Johnson used Stevenson’s refusal to
endorse the act against him for much of the campaign. 167 This, coupled with his voting
record, largely in support of the New Deal, combined to create the image of a politician
who refused precise definition as liberal or conservative Democrat.168 Stevenson, in stark
contrast, ran on a platform that denounced “political promises, excessive taxation, and
American communists.”169
In 1948, Johnson worked aggressively to make sure all Texans would know the
important lesson that he learned in his 1941 loss to Pappy O’Daniel— that he was one of
them: a rancher, a true cowboy, and, most importantly, someone who would work for
them in the Senate. Here, Johnson’s strong physical presence worked to great effect. At
one of his first campaign stops in Austin, Johnson got up to the platform, “sweaty in his
well-tailored suit,” and made a big show of pulling off his expensive Stetson hat (perhaps
the definitive piece of cowboy apparel), tossing it into the crowd, and shouting, “I throw
my hat into the ring!”170 All of this posturing worked to enhance the content of Johnson’s
speeches and reminded the people who came to see them that Johnson was truly a man of
Texas.
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Figure #3:

Here, Johnson arrived in Austin in May of 1948. Whereas in previous years, Johnson spoke to crowds
either bare-headed, or in a fedora, here, Johnson raised his Stetson, a literal symbol of the mythology he
wished to convey to people, in the air, above his head where it would be obvious to all. Johnson used
signifiers of the myth to make his appeals more obviously evocative of cowboy and western myths.

In his very first campaign appearance in May of 1948, Johnson opened with
rhetoric that made clear his approach to this campaign was very different than his
approach to previous campaigns. He began saying, “I intend to straddle no fences and
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sling no mud. Texas, and the world, have no time for that sort of thing today.”171
Johnson approached the campaign as a cowboy and a western hero speaking from a place
of power. He used vivid imagery evocative of a western persona, a man willing to do
dirty work, but not willing to fight dirty. He continued with the statement,
I believe I share this philosophy with most Texans: We’ll do
anything within reason to get along with our fellow human beings.
But we won’t stand for being pushed around.172
Johnson established himself as a a tough guy who was used to farming and wouldn’t
stand for someone telling him what to do, but also as a compromiser, someone willing to
work with others to get the job one. At once, Johnson evokeed a stereotypical cowboy
persona— a gun-slinging man who won’t be pushed around— and the frontier myth of
cooperation.
Johnson’s frontier-influenced strains of thought became particularly obvious when
he spoke of attitudes Americans should hold towards war and communism. In a speech
delivered in Austin in May of 1948, Johnson identified “preparedness, peace, and
progress” as three points on “the signpost to a better tomorrow.”173 Johnson spoke
against the violent strain of frontier brutality in this particular appeal. Johnson advocated
instead for peace and cooperation. He did not call citizens to battle. Instead, he called
them to be prepared to do their part. Johnson’s desire for progress was reminiscent of the
idea of people in a frontier town working together for civilization. Johnson called Texans
together for a common purpose.
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In addition to his use of rhetoric essential to his conception of the frontier myth,
Johnson made sure that the media and public were aware of his support of issues
considered western, those issues that helped bring civilization and order to places in
which no civilization or order existed. A June 1948 news release to all papers in Texas
read:
Johnson has long been a champion of rural electrification and has
established himself as one of the leading Congressional Authorities on
the subject. Through Johnson’s efforts two of the country’s largest co-ops
were established in his district many months before other farm sections
began to participate in REA benefits.174
Here, Johnson presented himself as the man most able to do the job of bringing
civilization to a place. Johnson’s support of rural electrification literally brought light to
towns all over Texas and the West at large. With electrification came civilization, and
Johnson wanted all of Texas to know that he was the western hero responsible for this
civilization. Johnson used the idea of rural electrification to ease supporters into the
other facets of his 1948 platform: conservation, higher pay for teachers, improvement in
healthcare quality, the guarantee of reasonable working hours, and a minimum wage.
These community-focused initiatives formed the core of Johnson’s political identity.
They were ideas born of the frontier, and their acceptance was dependent on belief in the
idea that human beings should help one another to make a place better.
Also important to Johnson’s presentation of himself as hero of the West was a
focus on the issues facing the farmers of Texas. A transcript of a speech Johnson
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delivered at least five times: in Austin, San Antonio, Houston, Beaumont, and Sherman,
illustrates his focus on and ownership of issues that affected farmers.
I was born and raised on a farm. I milked cows, dipped cattle,
picked cotton, weighed it up, and occasionally got to take cotton
to the gin...saw my own home place sold because cotton dropped.175
In announcing his support in this way, Johnson pointed to his personal experiences and
emphasized that he was in a position to recognize and understand the problems of farmers
and the significance of farm programs to their livelihoods.
Additionally, Johnson used rhetoric to create the image of Texas, and especially
West Texas, as a place of mythic significance to the frontier. His words helped establish a
clear image of Texas as a place of beauty and importance to America. In a speech
delivered over radio to residents of Fort Worth in May of 1948, Johnson said:
You know, if my hometown [Johnson City] were a little larger, we
might disrupt Fort Worth’s claim to being the place where the west begins.
We think the west begins a little east of Johnson City, where the purple hills
start rising into the plateau country. Texans like to think of their state as a
world in itself; and we who are native to the Hill Country and the Edwards
Plateau are inclined to consider ourselves as a special kinds of Texan-the West Texan. If all the stories about West Texans were laid end to end,
well it would make enough bragging to fill several volumes of the
Congressional Record.176
Johsnon knew that the West was a place important to voters. He recognized the mythic
significance of the place in which he was situated, so he presented Texas as the very
starting point of the West. He made Texas come alive with his vivid description of its
rolling hills. More importantly, he made the people of Texas, and the myths that
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surrounded them, come alive. He made their experiences seem powerful and he made
voters believe that he himself was one of these special West Texans, the very embodiment
of the myth.
Whereas Stevenson only delivered pre-planned addresses to small groups of
Texans, Johnson was in his element delivering impromptu speeches to large crowds all
over the enormous state. Johnson was a performer who could sense the mood of a crowd.
Though his precise delivery varied, Johnson rarely strayed from a message that advocated
government aid and foreign peace and belittled his opponent. 177 Johnson promised that
he could be the man to get the job done—to raise the living standards of all Texans— and
he promised it in a way that made people feel at ease with him, like he truly was one of
them. A Johnson aide remarked, “He [spoke] their language—language they can
understand.”178
Stevenson’s response to Johnson’s employment of a western myth-centered
strategy was uninspired. Though Stevenson was a man who was authentically western, a
man who was born and raised in West Texas and lived the ranching life of a West Texan,
his record had none of the frontier sensibility and populist sentiment of Johnson’s.
Stevenson voted to reduce funds for river authorities, cut back on teachers’ salaries, and
abolished the Old Age Assistance Fund, a fund specifically created to support the elderly,
blind, and dependent children.179 Nevertheless, Stevenson had popularity and name
recognition in his corner. The race was tight.
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On July 24, 1948, Texans voted for their Senator. Unfortunately, this vote would
not stand—no candidate won a majority of the vote, and a majority was necessary to
secure a winner.

Stevenson captured forty percent of the vote. Johnson trailed with

thirty-four percent of the vote. Johnson won his own district, the Tenth, and surrounding
districts, the Eleventh, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth.180 A run-off election was scheduled for
Sunday, August 29, 1948.
If Johnson wanted to win the Democratic primary for this Senate seat, he needed
to solidify his strategy, once and for all. It would be the ultimate test of the broad appeal
of western and cowboy mythology. Johnson, though momentarily discouraged by his
loss, told friends that he could win if he “worked hard enough.”181 Johnson intensified
his campaigning, flying to multiple cities in the same day as Stevenson meandered the
enormous state by train. Stevenson was the outdated and old Texas politician. Johnson
represented new politics: a man savvy enough to take his life experience and the myth he
internalized, and to disseminate it as widely and as quickly as possible.
In the build-up to the run-off election, Johnson called once again upon the lessons
he learned in 1941 from Pappy O’Daniel. In that election, O’Daniel filled constituents’
mailboxes with the O’Daniel News, a paper outlining his positions and strong connection
to the people of the District. In late July of 1948, Johnson launched the Johnson Journal,
a four-page newsletter created at Johnson headquarters, and made to appear like an oldtime, genuine weekly paper. This Johnson Journal was distributed to 340,000 mailboxes
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in Texas with the headline “Communists Favor Coke.” The inside of the paper contained
appeals to the common man—the farmer.182
In his final speeches before the run-off election, Johnson made sure to clearly
state that he was the true candidate of West Texas and frontier tradition. He emphasized
his ties to the land and outlined the way that a real Texan would behave in electoral
politics. Certainly he attacked Stevenson on the basis of policy, but his more powerful
and resonant appeals painted himself as a real man of the frontier and Stevenson as some
sort of impostor. Johnson recognized that these personal appeals based on a man’s
character, relationship with the land, and relationship with the people of that land were
more meaningful and powerful. Greeting supporters at a speech in Houston, Johnson
said,
I like to get out and be with people. Texans don’t want a
Senator who is afraid to leave air-conditioned hotel rooms
and speak to the people.183
Johnson purported to know what Texans wanted in a Senator. He said they wanted a man
who was not afraid to be with people. They didn’t want a man who was “fussy,” and
Johnson implied that “fussy” was precisely the type of man Coke Stevenson was.
Johnson presented himself as the true Texas politician, a man not afraid to literally get his
hands dirty interacting with the people of Texas.
Johnson used rhetoric to encourage others to imagine him as the candidate of the
farmer. He tried to use his own experience living on a farm to appeal to the sensibilities
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of the people to whom he spoke. Speaking of himself at an address in Sherman, Johnson
said,
LBJ is the farmer’s friend. I was born in the cedar brake country
near the little town of Johnson City and grew up in those hills.
At my father’s knee I was taught the wisdom in the words of one
of our great statesmen who said the great cities rest upon our broad
and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and
your cities will spring up again...but destroy our farms and the grass
will grow in the streets of every city in this country.184
Johnson worked to place significance—literal and mythic—on the vital role of the farmer
in Texas. He established Texas and the myth of the frontier as important to everyone in
America. He implied that great cities everywhere in America, not just in Texas, rested on
these prairies and on the backs of these farmers. He said that while we could do without
cities, we could not do without farmers, their farms, and the ideas that these important
symbols of the myth represent. Later in the same speech, Johnson said Texans were
“marching together in this victory march...the Big Texans, with big hearts, strong hands,
and cool heads...The Texans who are doers...”185 Johnson equated being Texan with
being a part of the myth. He said Texans were tough folks who got things done. He
situated Texans in the frontier mythology as people who did important things, made
towns, and most importantly, made America the power that it was. He labeled himself as
one of these people.
Johnson, taking advantage of new media and the potential for wide dissemination
of the myth that it allowed, used radio to present himself as cowboy. In at least twenty
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radio addresses that aired all over Texas— in Austin, in Houston, in San Antonio, in
Sherman, in small rural communities that were only able to listen to the message because
of Johnson’s support of rural electrification—the same message ran. An announcer
boomed it before Johnson even began speaking, and firmly established an image of
Johnson as cowboy in the minds of listeners.
This young man comes from the Texas Hill Country and has that
hill country look. Six feet three inches tall and weighing more
than 200 pounds, LBJ has the kind of rugged frame you expect
to find on a Texan. He’s sun-tanned and vigorous...
[the crowds of TX] like his aggressive energy, they like his
common sense in dealing with our problems.186
If one didn’t know better, they might think they were listening to a reading of a pulp
Western novel. Johnson’s enormous size and strength were emphasized, and these
characteristics were tied to the very fact that he was born in the Hill Country. Labeled as
vigorous and aggressive; Johnson would fight for people, but not blindly or using brute
force, for the message also labeled him as a man with common sense.
In his final address before the definitive vote took place, Johnson presented
himself as a Texas boy, a man situated in his place and in the frontier myth. Johnson
emphasized the fact that he was Texas born above all other attributes. He emphasized the
western issues in his voting record and made clear the importance of these issues not only
in Texas, but also in the United States. He made clear that his cowboy identity, so
defined by the features of the frontier myth, was the direction in which America needed
to look for its leaders.
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I come to you now at the end of this campaign simply as Lyndon
Johnson, a Texas boy, born and raised here in Texas...and I think all
of these things, building dams, helping farmers, are a part of the long
range plan which we should get busy on here in Texas and in the
United States of America.187
Johnson made populism—the idea that he was a simple Texas boy and just one of the
common folk—a central theme at the end of his campaign. It is telling that his last appeal
was linked inextricably to and centered around the western persona he established earlier
in the campaign and not to his voting record or attacks of Coke Stevenson. Johnson
recognized what would resonate with his supporters, and that was a man who, like them,
had lived this frontier experience. This appeal was powerful because it made frontier and
West Texas concerns: concerns with the control of water, aid to farmers, bringing more
civilization to a place the concerns of the nation as a whole. Johnson, in his ownership of
this myth, fashioned himself a national identity as he made the concerns of Texans
problems of national significance.
Ultimately, the run-off was one of the closest elections in American history. ProJohnson election judges held back complete election returns from the Texas Election
Bureau so that Stevenson forces would not know how many votes they needed to take the
election. The lead in vote count alternated between Johnson and Stevenson. Both men
went to extraordinary (and illegal) measures to ensure a win.188 A sort of mini tragedy
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played out. Ridiculous coincidences abounded, but ultimately, in late September, the
Texas Democratic Convention certified (by a vote of 29-28, no less), that Johnson was
the Democratic party from Texas’ official candidate for the Senatorial general election.189
Stevenson took the election to court, alleging voter fraud.190 County election
officials, when forced to testify before a court, were vague and seemed to have trouble
remembering the events of only a month before. The conservative wing of the
Democratic party in Texas helped Stevenson’s campaign collect evidence of fraud
perpetrated by the Johnson campaign. The campaign filed an injunction in attempt to
keep Johnson’s name off the ballot of the November 3, 1948 general election. Johnson
and his supporters lobbied effectively to postpone election inquiries and prevent the
injunction from coming to fruition. Johnson easily defeated a weak Republican
challenger. Congressman Johnson finally became Senator Johnson.
1948 was the single most significant year in Johnson’s political life. In 1948,
Johnson cultivated a national image based upon his lived experiences and a powerful
myth. Johnson grew into a politician who recognized and had conscious control over his
own image. Johnson recognized the power of the frontier myth, both in Texas and in the
nation as a whole, and moved to base his entire image on his myth. Through his support
of policies that played into elements of this myth—policies like maintaining peace
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internationally, bringing civilization to places where there was little, and working
together as a community to support teachers, the elderly, and children, Johnson
established himself as a true embodiment of the feminized strain of the frontier myth.
Additionally, Johnson learned to use rhetoric that included signifiers of the west so that
even before voters looked at his record, they would know that he was a true westerner. In
1948, Johnson proved once and for all that this innovative approach to politics,
combining lived experience with the complex mythos associated with a place and a type
of person, was exactly the direction in which national politics was headed. Johnson
himself was at the forefront of this American shift in focus to the west.
Johnson’s senatorial career presents us with the image of a man clearly gearing up
for a national stage. In early 1951, Johnson acquired another important signifier of the
western myth he embodied: his very own ranch. The ranch was not entirely political
posturing, for it previously belonged to his aunt, and for the rest of his life, even after he
left the White House, Johnson poured money into the ranch and enjoyed spending time
there.191 However, most importantly the ranch symbolized Johnson’s aspirations and
became the place he used to hone his political image, the image that he clicked firmly
into place in 1948.192
Johnson was a master of the Senate, but he did not become Majority Leader in
1955 because of his emphasis on the cooperative strain of the frontier myth. Instead,
Johnson used manipulation of people in power to gain appointment to prestigious
committees, and to establish himself as a leader. Though the community-oriented spirit
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of frontier myth was clearly very much still a part of the way Johnson voted, this voting
record was over-shadowed by the aggressive, individualistic approach Johnson took to
gaining and keeping power in the Senate.
Figure #4:

Johnson’s “Treatment”

Perhaps one of Johnson’s most-remembered habits is what historians frequently
refer to as “The Treatment.” Johnson’s “treatment” was essentially a form of bullying, a
sort of extreme posturing to get his way. Johnson’s arsenal included gentle prodding,
begging, logical arguments, stern warnings, threats, and outright intimidation.193 Whereas
the Johnson of electoral campaigns was a man who emphasized cooperation and working
together to bring everyone to the same standards of living, the Johnson of the Senate and
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the Presidency was a Johnson drunk with power, a man who would do anything to obtain
power and push through legislation he supported. Interestingly, the legislation Johnson
supported did not abandon his community-focused strain of the frontier myth. Johnson
most frequently supported legislation designed to help people.
In 1960, John F. Kennedy, the Democratic nominee for President (only after a
fierce battle with Lyndon Johnson), asked Johnson to join his ticket as Vice-President.
Johnson accepted, and after helping to secure electoral victory against Richard Nixon by
again calling upon his western heritage, Johnson served rather unremarkably as VicePresident until President Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963. Johnson was
sworn in as the 36th President of the United States that day.
In his six-year presidency Johnson at once embodied the characteristics of the
community-oriented strain of the frontier myth and the violent, individualistic strain of
the frontier myth. Johnson did more than any other President to help the underprivileged
in the United States. His community-oriented politics culminated in a series of initiatives
labeled The Great Society. The Great Society was an enormous collection of welfareoriented legislation. At one point, the bills that fit the Great Society label numbered over
two-hundred.194 In 1964 and 1965, Johnson’s focused completely on the programs of the
Great Society, speaking of the importance of “quality of life, beauty, community, and
dignity.”195 He implored all American to strive together towards a utopian ideal. Johnson
remained idealistic. He wanted to bring civilization to all Americans in the form of
governmental assistance. Perhaps this is most important to emphasize about the
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community-oriented strain of the frontier myth that surfaced when Johnson was President
—the belief in the power of government to bring civilization and to enrich the lives of all
citizens.
We may be having a very different conversation about the implications for the use
of western and cowboy mythology in modern American politics if Lyndon Johnson’s
story had ended with the Great Society, which was literally an illustration of the
community-oriented strain of the frontier myth that developed in him through his
experiences in Texas. Unfortunately, Johnson was also exposed to the darker side of the
myth, and this masculinized strain surfaced in Johnson’s dealings with the Vietnam War.
The violent, individualistic strain of the frontier myth involves a division of
borders. The most basic border distinction is the Indian/White distinction, which roughly
equates to a civilized/savage distinction.196 As previously discussed, fundamentally this
myth is dependent on a critical assumption, an assumption that Johnson made in his
dealings in Vietnam:
the conquest of the wilderness and the subjugation or displacement
of the Native Americans who originally inhabited it have been the
means to our achievement of a national identity, a democratic
polity, an ever-expanding economy and a phenomenally dynamic
and 'progressive' civilization197
Johnson’s decisions in Vietnam stemmed from a deep-seated belief in the idea of
American exceptionalism, and that exceptionalism was inextricably tied to the frontier.
Here, Vietnam was a new frontier to be conquered and Johnson, because of his
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internalized conception of myth, believed it was necessary for America to conquer this
frontier to maintain a national identity. Johnson took America past the point of no return
in Vietnam. Even when things took a turn for the worse, Johnson continued to commit
America planes, weapons, and men to Vietnam.198
In the minds of the majority of the American public, Johnson’s involvement in
foreign affairs was repulsive and wrong. They viewed America’s involvement in this
foreign war as a sort of posturing for superiority. America did not want to be defined by
the myth that defined Johnson. They did not want to live in a country that was seen by
the world as an aggressor who would use violence to achieve national identity and to put
its stamp of approval on foreign countries. Johnson, in acting the internalized role of
cowboy, in being the bearer of this strain of the frontier myth, saw the public turn against
him in large numbers. In a tragic end to the triumph of the first real cowboy President,
Johnson decided not to run for reelection in 1968.
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Epilogue
Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?:
Do Cowboy Politics Have Staying Power in an Expanding American Political
Landscape?
In her 1998 masterpiece, singer-songwriter Paula Cole, from the depths of her
romantic longing, asks a question surprisingly important to an analysis of the postJohnson American political landscape: where have all the cowboys gone? While Cole is
looking for “her John Wayne,” her “prairie song,” and her “happy ending,” we are left to
wonder where all of cowboys like Lyndon Johnson have gone. Certainly, we can look to
the last thirty years of the Republican party and see the cowboy myth alive. However,
while the myth may be alive, Johnson’s preferred version of the myth, the feminized
version emphasizing the spirit of community and a connection to the land, is certainly not
well.
With Johnson’s decision not to seek office in 1968 came the end of the
community-oriented cowboy myth in American politics. Since Johnson, no liberal
Democrat has taken up the beacon of cowboy myth in a nationally-significant way. The
Republican party, however, is quite a different story. Because of the candidates
Republicans nominate, because of the western places they frequently come from, they
often identify with the masculinized version of frontier myth that values individualism.
Thus, in the past thirty years, conservatives have been responsible for a complete
bastardization of what it means to be a cowboy.
The story begins with Johnson’s opponent in the 1964 Presidential Race, Barry
Goldwater from Arizona. Goldwater represented the Republicans’ first attempt at
appropriation of the masculinized version of the frontier myth. Goldwater presented his
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campaign’s themes— “downsized government, reduced taxes and regulations, and
expanded individual freedoms”— as a special brand of individualism, fundamentally tied
to the masculinized frontier ethos.199
Goldwater developed a ruggedly individualistic and masculine brand of
conservative politics. Though born to a life of wealth and privilege, Goldwater thought
of and presented himself as a man of the West. He liked to hunt and hike. This,
combined with his staunch anti-Communist stance, made Goldwater a politician that
Americans responded and related to. The modern, populist brand of conservatism that in
later years, George W. Bush used to appeal to peoplewas born in Goldwater. Goldwater
rallied a generation of southern whites to the conservative cause. 200
Ronald Reagan was inspired by Goldwater’s rugged individualistic views about
conservatism. In the speech that launched his political career, Reagan discussed his
support of Goldwater’s 1964 campaign and emphasized the value of this masculinized
strain of frontier myth.
The Founding Fathers knew a government can't control the economy
without controlling people. And they knew when a government sets out
to do that, it must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose. So we have
come to a time for choosing. You and I are told we must choose between
a left or right, but I suggest there is no such thing as a left or right. There is
only an up or down. Up to man's age-old dream – the maximum of individual
freedom consistent with order – or down to the ant heap of totalitarianism.201

199

“Barry Goldwater: No One Around to Fill His Cowboy Boots,” New York Times, June 22, 1998.

200

David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press: 2010), 77.
201

“A Time for Choosing,” New York Times, October 13, 1964.
102

In 1981, the ascension of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency brought cowboys back
to the political mainstream. Reagan was an actor who had literally played cowboys on
film. He was not born a cowboy; rather, Reagan came of political age in the era of
Lyndon Johnson. Reagan knew that the role of cowboy had mythic significance in the
minds of Americans. Because of this, Reagan learned to play the role of cowboy, albeit a
very different kind of cowboy than Lyndon Johnson.
Reagan attempted to capitalize on the romantic notion that cowboys are straightshooting, honest and forthright men who tell the truth. Reagan’s act was powerful, and
he cultivated the image of cowboy even more successfully and completely than Lyndon
Johnson before him. The crucial difference, however, was that Reagan’s act was just that
— a great performance from a good and committed actor. Reagan was exposed as a liar
and a cheat when, in November 1986, it was disclosed that the Reagan administration had
been bargaining with terrorists by selling arms to Iran. Reagan went on television and
vehemently denied that any such sale had occurred. He retracted this statement a week
later. After the incident, popular support for Reagan plummeted.202
Additionally, Reagan represented a type of cowboy not interested in helping
others. Instead, his conception of cowboy was economically conservative. Cowboy, as
imagined by Reagan, and later, George W. Bush, was a man who stood up for himself,
and only himself. He rejected notions that he should help others. He was individualistic
and looked out only for himself. This type of cowboy was manipulated to fit the aims of
the Republican party.
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Most importantly, Reagan, in his years in office, escalated the Cold War. Reagan
was notable among post-World War II Presidents in that he believed the Soviet Union
could be defeated through confrontation. This desire for showdown is perhaps the very
worst feature of the masculinized frontier myth. Reagan acted as “heroic President:” a
leader not acting out the majority will, but instead, acting “out of a higher and more
perfect sense of the nation’s mission and necessity than any popular majority could
possess.”203 Reagan acted using this myth as guidance, and perpetuated a nation where
violence to justify victory was the norm.
After Ronald Reagan came George H.W. Bush, a wealthy Texas outsider who
moved to Houston from Connecticut as an adult. Regardless of this important difference,
George H.W. Bush still attempted to present himself as a cowboy in his campaigns for
Senate in 1964. Bush failed, however, and the media called his bluff. An article
reflecting back on the campaign at its end, said Bush “never quite could convince the
people he was really one of them.”204
As President, George H.W. Bush was frequently mocked for his disingenuous
cowboy image. Frequently, opposition bemoaned “poor George,” who just “couldn’t
help being born with a silver spoon in his mouth.”205 It is important, however, to mention
the masculinized strain of frontier myth Bush evoked in his foreign policy because of the
impression these policies made on his son. In August 1990, Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein,
invaded its oil-rich neighbor to the south, Kuwait; Bush condemned the invasion and
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rallied opposition to Iraq in the United States and among European, Asian, and Middle
Eastern allies. Allied forces launched an attack several months later in what became
known as the Gulf War. Bush made the decision to stop the offensive after a mere 100
hours. Critics labeled this decision premature, as hundreds of Iraqi forces were able to
escape; Bush responded by saying that he wanted to minimize US casualties.206
However, this feeling of an unfulfilled quest haunted his son’s political career.
George W. Bush, though raised in Texas, was molded by a significantly different
set of factors than Lyndon Johnson and his own father. Bush was born in Connecticut
and raised in Houston, Texas. The son of a wealthy family, Bush faced none of the same
struggles of Lyndon Johnson. Bush, however, recognized that he could use signifiers of
the myth to appeal to Americans. Less than a year before his bid for the presidency, Bush
purchased a Crawford, Texas ranch, which he sold immediately upon leaving office. His
accent, his vacations on this Texas ranch, and his penchant for country metaphors
contributed to his folksy American cowboy image, an image that, like Reagan’s, was
created almost solely for mass media consumption.
In 2003, using the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. as
justification, George W. Bush declared a “War on Terrorism.” Media response accused
Bush of being a cowboy. In a rare interview with Vice-President Dick Cheney, journalist
Tim Russert asked:
There is a perception, however, if you read any of the papers in Europe
and around the world, the constant description of the president as a cowboy,
that he wants to go it alone, that the president and you and the administration
that was perceived as extremely confident on foreign policy has been stumbling
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and hasn’t reached out and nurtured alliances...207
This image of Bush as cowboy evokes the masculinized, ruggedly individualistic strain of
frontier myth, and represented all that could go wrong in cowboy politics that subscribed
to that particular ethos. Cheney, for his part, emphasized his belief that these qualities in
President Bush were positive. Cheney responded to Russert’s questioning with an answer
that avoided confrontation of the reality of the violence of the myth.
So the notion that the president is a cowboy—I don’t know, is a Westerner,
I think that’s not necessarily a bad idea. I think the fact of the matter is he
cuts to the chase. He is very direct and I find that very refreshing 208
Bush was depicted as rash. His cowboy attitude was frequently described as something
negative. People abroad began to respond negatively to Americans and American culture
because of what cowboy became in the hands of George W. Bush.
George W. Bush is a fake cowboy. From media accounts, you'd reckon
that the president was a buckaroo to the bones. He plays up the imag,
big-time, with $300 designer cowboy boots, a $1,000 cowboy hat, and
his 1,600-acre Prairie Chapel Ranch in Crawford, Texas. He guns his
rhetoric with frontier lingo, saying that he'll "ride herd" over ornery
Middle Eastern governments and "smoke out" enemies in wild mountain
passes. He branded Saddam Hussein's Iraq "an outlaw regime" and
took the vanquished dictator's pistol as a trophy. As for Osama bin Laden,
Bush declared, "I want justice. And there's an old poster out West, I recall,
that says, 'Wanted: Dead or Alive.'209
Bush’s foreign policy adventure in the Iraq War is frequently compared to
Johnson’s experience in Vietnam. In both cases, men embodying the individualistic,
stubborn strain of the frontier myth entered into foreign wars which served little purpose
other than to spread the conception of American dominance and superiority to other
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cultures. This justification for the killing of thousands of innocents represents what can
happen when this violent strain of frontier mythology is brought from widely
disseminated fiction into actual foreign policy decisions. It didn’t work for Johnson, and
it failed for George W. Bush.
Since Bush, there have been few contenders to take up the burden of the
furtherance of cowboy and western mythology in America politics. In the current
Republican primary cycle, we have seen Rick Perry, Governor of Texas, attempt to carry
on Bush’s legacy. His approach, which favored showing up to events in a Stetson,
dropping cowboy colloquialisms, and speaking in generalities about his political views,
has already failed. The remaining men in the field, economic-focused Mitt Romney and
ultra-social conservative Rick Santorum have made little attempt to draw upon Perry’s
approach.
So what does the Republican party’s failure at a continuance of the myth say
about its future in American politics? Western and cowboy mythology is incredibly
gendered and race-specific. Cowboys are white men. Women and minorities have little
place in the traditional cowboy-hero story, other than as supporting actors. As our
political realm expands to include women and people of color, the cowboy myth has
proven inadequate.
More and more rapidly, the American political system, and Americans in general,
are moving away from the enormous significance they placed on cowboy and western
mythology. In Johnson’s early political career, we see a community-oriented version of
the cowboy myth that worked in politics. Unfortunately, this success has been
overshadowed by the role the more violent strain of the cowboy myth played in Vietnam.
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Resuscitations of the myth have been unsuccessful because Republican candidates trying
to take ownership of the myth have relied on this self-serving and violent strain of the
myth.
For now, Johnson’s conception of cowboy and western mythology is all but dead
and buried in the American political realm. For a successful employment of this strategy,
a politician must attempt to capitalize on this community-oriented strain—the idea that a
cowboy is a most fundamentally a helper, not a man of great violence who seeks to
venture the uncivilized areas of the world and stamp ‘America’ upon them.
There are, however, some small signs of life from the myth in Montana. The
state’s Governor, Brian Schweitzer, represents an example of a western Democrat
concerned more with populism and issues of the West than he is with putting on a
cowboy hat and getting involved in a violent foreign conflict. In an editorial to the New
York Times, Schweitzer responded to people who wanted to know how Montana
managed to balance its budget. Schweitzer spoke in simple terms that appealed to
common people and evoked a particular frontier experience in his answer:
How do we accomplish what most states and the federal government
cannot? I like to say we run government like a ranch. In ranching—
my old job— you either pinch pennies or go belly-up. We do the
same in government. Perhaps Washington can try it.210
There are signs that Schweitzer wants to manipulate the imagery of cowboys and
the West as well. In what was labeled “a dramatic way to make a point—Montana style,”
Schweitzer vetoed a long list of far-right bills with a literal veto branding iron.211
Schweitzer took offense at the extremist bills the far-right wanted to force on “his
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people.” Schweitzer, so far, seems to be taking Johnson’s populist, western-image
focused approach to politics—and it’s working. An approach like Schweitzer’s—that
uses the rhetoric and image, but also has a legitimate populist appeal and concern—could
rehabilitate Lyndon Johnson’s preferred version of the myth.
In November of 2011, this Pennsylvania girl made the long trip to Texas. When I
arrived in Houston, I was late for my connecting flight, and terribly lost in the airport
(because everything really is bigger in Texas, even airports). As I hustled past a row of
men having their boots shined, I heard a booming voice, a real life cowboy. “Y’all
lookin’ for your flight?” Did I judge him for using the phrase “y’all?” Absolutely. But
that man became my hero when he followed me through the airport to help me find my
gate. My mother tried to tip him, but with a simple tip of the hat he was gone. Cowboys
like Lyndon still exist, and the community-oriented cowboy is not dead, though his
narrative may currently be in American politics. If we re-conceptualize the myth, if we
take it back from the interpretation that spelled doom for Johnson, a new strain of the
myth, a strain that includes all people and focuses on the important of all people, could
emerge as powerful in American politics. The myth is still very much alive in the
American consciousness—and maybe if in twenty years we still can’t find it, we should
just go looking in the Houston Airport.
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